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Southern Organizing Drive, often referred to as “Operation Dixie.” The Community
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labor and organized religion, in the hopes that improved church-labor relations would
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religious leaders. This thesis examines the methods utilized by the CRD to achieve this end,
and presents an analysis both of their efficacy and of their implementation. Specific
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nearly sixty years ago, the Congress of Industrial Organizations launched the largest
organizing drive in the history of the South. This organizing campaign, directed by the
Southern Organizing Committee (SOC,) and commonly referred to as “Operation Dixie,”
lasted from 1946 to 1953, and encompassed organizing efforts in twelve southern states,
undertaken by as many as two hundred and fifty paid organizers.1 In the more than fifty
years since the drive came to an end, it has received some scattered attention from historians,
but surprisingly little, when the historical significance of this pivotal moment in the history
of industrial unionism is considered. Only one full-length book chronicling Operation Dixie,
The Crisis of American Labor, by Barbara Griffith has been produced to date. In the preface
to her book, Griffith writes that her “intent is to open up the topic by setting in place the
broad historical framework, both national and Southern, within which the men and women of
the CIO and their corporate opponents lived through the daily realities of the struggle.”2
While Griffith’s work may well have succeeded in “opening up” the topic of Operation
Dixie, her lead has not been followed in any significant way, and surprisingly little work has
been published on the subject in the almost twenty years since The Crisis of American Labor
was published. This is particularly unfortunate given the rapid pace at which the field of
Southern labor history has expanded over the last two decades, both in the sheer size of the

1

Griffith, Barbara, The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO, Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988, p. 26.
2
Ibid, p. xiv.
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field –the number of practitioners, the number of publications, etc – but also in terms of the
scope of the issues deemed pertinent to the study of the Southern working class.3
There are many factors at work here, not the least of which is that the CIO, as a
whole, was a predominantly Northern organization, whose strongest unions were in the
Northeast and the industrial Midwest. For historians of the UAW, the UE, or the USWA,
Operation Dixie, while perhaps of tangential interest, is largely irrelevant. In the sub-field of
Southern Labor history, Operation Dixie has fared rather better. Any history of Southern
labor in the period after the Second World War, must address the Southern organizing drive
to some extent. Even here, however, the drive receives only limited coverage. Since many
of these works have tended to be rather specialized case studies dealing with specific union
locals, or histories of labor in a specific city or state, the coverage given to Operation Dixie
has, naturally, tended to be rather glancing, limited to how the drive related to the author’s
particular object of study. A further complicating factor, perhaps, has to do with the
emphasis placed, by the organizers of Operation Dixie, on the unionization of the textile
industry. Although organizing also took place in other industries, including steel, meatpacking, and tobacco, the main concern of Operation Dixie was the textile industry. Textiles
made up the largest component of Southern industry, and posed the clearest threat to the CIO
unions of the North, as more and more textile manufacturers relocated their operations to the
low-wage, non-unionized, South. The Southern textile industry, even more than Southern
industry as a whole, has a uniquely depressing history of successive failures when it comes to
3

For an overview of how the field has developed over the past twenty years, see: Brattain, Michelle, “The
Pursuits of Post-exceptionalism: Race, Gender, Class, and Politics in the New Southern Labor History,” in
Eskew, Glenn, ed., Labor in the Modern South, Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2001.
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organizing. While the events of Operation Dixie make a compelling story, they must
compete with even more monumental failures that occurred in 1919, 1929, and 1934.
Indeed, one textile historian, Timothy Minchin, has argued that Operation Dixie was not
nearly as important in the post-war history of Southern textile workers as was the general
strike of 1951, which, he argues, signaled the effective end of the TWUA’s prospects in the
South. Finally, for reasons that are not readily apparent, much of Southern labor history thus
far, and it should be remembered that the field is a relatively new one, has tended to focus on
the period prior to the Second World War.
Whatever the reasons may be, the end result has been rather limited coverage of
Operation Dixie in the historiography of twentieth-century labor. However understandable
this neglect may be, it is most unfortunate. Operation Dixie represented an opportunity for
the labor movement of truly enormous proportions. By the end of the Second World War,
the CIO was firmly entrenched in Northern industry, and had secured a level of
respectability, and power, both economic and political, that had never before been achieved
by a labor confederation. However these achievements were imperiled by the existence of
the South as a large region typified by cheap, non-union labor. The South was also the home
region for a significant contingent of conservative Democrats, whose fierce opposition to
organized labor, and political power based on long years of congressional seniority,
threatened a labor movement whose fortunes had been, by this point, firmly tied to the
political success of liberal, New Deal Democrats. The South was thus the exposed flank of
the labor movement, whose organization could spell the victory, or, if it remained

4

unorganized, threaten the defeat, of the labor movement as a whole. The advantages to be
gained by organizing the South were monumental, and so were the consequences of failure.
The vast potential of the South, and its importance to the future of organized labor were
recognized by the leaders of the CIO, and it was this recognition that prompted the launching
of Operation Dixie in May of 1946.
Operation Dixie was, in many ways, a pivotal event in the organizational life of the
CIO. From its beginnings in 1935, the organization had expanded rapidly, scoring success
after success, and expanding rapidly to include millions of workers within its various
constituent unions. Until 1946, this rapid expansion had seemed all but unstoppable, but in
the post-war years the CIO seemed to have hit head-on against a brick wall. Many factors
were at work here: the nation’s political swing to the right, the passage of Taft-Hartley in
1947, the multitude of state “right to work” laws that began cropping up after the war, and
even ideological divisions within the CIO itself. Among these factors, was the failure of the
CIO’s Southern organizing drive, a failure that would have important long-run effects upon
the viability of the organization, and indeed, upon the future of the labor movement as a
whole. In 1946, the “fragile juggernaut” of the CIO, as Robert Zieger terms it, ran head-on
into the intransigent wall of Southern society, and the juggernaut stalled out, while the wall
held firm.4 The failure of the CIO to organize the South during the 1940s held important
long-term implications for both the CIO and the South. For the CIO, the South remained a
low-wage haven for runaway Northern manufacturers who could escape the economic

4

Zieger, Robert, The CIO 1935-1955, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995, p. 227.
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demands of the unions by relocating to the South. For the South, the lack of powerful,
politically engaged unions, helped to perpetuate a system characterized by concentrated
economic power, low wages, weak worker protection laws, and conservative politics, a
system that would not be effectively challenged until the advent of the modern Civil Rights
Movement.
Operation Dixie, launched amid high hopes, and expectations of success, was not a
notably successful organizing drive, and evaluations of the project have varied from the
purely negative to the highly mixed. Griffith maintains that the drive was a complete failure,
and even goes so far as to argue that it effectively ended within a year, despite the fact that it
remained formally operative through 19535. Robert Zieger, in his overview of the campaign,
agrees with Griffith’s assessment, writing of the drive that “by the end of 1946 it had become
a sideshow.6” Others have been somewhat more positive, noting that while the drive was
perhaps a failure in terms of its declared goals, it produced some positive achievements. For
example, Operation Dixie did bring many committed activists into the labor movement, and
provided important learning experiences for future organizers, experiences that would aide
them in future organizing efforts. Some of the organizers in Operation Dixie viewed the
drive as at least a partial success, pointing to the important benefits derived by at least some
newly-unionized workers who were organized during the drive.7 Finally, Timothy Minchin
argues that while the CIO failed to bring in many new recruits through its efforts, the climate
5

Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 161.
Zieger, The CIO, p. 228.
7
Minchin, Timothy, What Do We Need A Union For?, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997,
p. 32.
6
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produced by Operation Dixie helped to boost wages throughout the region, as many
employers improved wages and conditions in order to ward off unions.8
Whatever the incidental benefits derived from Operation Dixie, it is clear that, at least
in terms of the CIO’s initial declared goals for the campaign, nothing less than the
organization of Southern industry as a whole, it was a failure. The fact that Operation Dixie
was a failure does not, however, mean that it is without interest, and indeed quite the
opposite is true. In addition to their purely historical interest, organizing drives are of
interest because of what they can tell us about the efficacy of various tactics utilized by labor
unions to recruit new members. In this regard, failed campaigns are often more instructive
than successful ones.9 A successful organizing drive may succeed for a variety of reasons,
not all of them having anything to do with the tactics adopted by union organizers. Many
times when union elections are successful, it has been because the workers were ready and
willing to organize, for reasons of their own having to do with local conditions and
grievances. In situations such as this, the organizer’s role is simply to make themselves
available, and guide the workers through the process of forming a union.10 Unsuccessful
drives, on the other hand, provide the researcher with a better opportunity to study methods

8

Ibid., p. 65
While strikes possess a dynamic distinct from, and somewhat different from, organizing campaigns, there are
certain similarities. For examples of studies dealing with failed strikes, see Liston Pope’s Millhands and
Preachers, dealing with the failed strike at Gastonia, North Carolina in 1929, or the coverage of the general
strike of 1934 in Like a Family by Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, et al.
10
The classic example would be the explosive growth of the UAW in the aftermath of the Flint sit-down strike
of 1937. In the South, a similar situation existed in the months leading up to the 1934 General Textile Strike, in
which workers, angered by what they perceived to be the implementation of a “stretch-out” in the textile mills,
formed UTWA locals almost faster than organizers could charter them. See for example, Waldrep, G.C.,
Southern Workers and the Search for Community, chapter 2.
9
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and tactics. Clearly the strategy employed by unsuccessful organizers was ineffective, but
the researcher is left with the task of explaining why this was so.
In the case of Operation Dixie, many explanations for its failure have been advanced
in the years since the drive’s conclusion. These explanations, indeed, have been almost as
numerous as the writers who have approached the question. Some have focused on the
culture of Southern mill and factory workers, arguing that Southern workers were simply too
individualistic and backward to join labor unions.11 Others have focused on the role played
by employer oppression, often with the assistance of local authorities, in keeping workers
from joining unions, and busting unions if, and when they are formed.12 Another explanation
focuses on the role of race in alienating Southern workers from the CIO, a body that formally
supported rights for blacks, and which officially advocated integration (although it should be
noted that these egalitarian goals were frequently ignored by CIO locals, and not just in the
South.)13 In addition to race-baiting, the CIO was also frequently attacked by anti-labor
Southerners for being a supposedly communist-dominated organization, or at the very least,
an organization infiltrated by communists.14 Indeed, for many Southern critics of the CIO, its
11

Although not actually dealing with Operation Dixie, this argument is advanced in its classic form by W.J.
Cash in The Mind of the South.
12
Of all of the factors contributing to the failure of Operation Dixie, this is, arguably, the most significant. For
arguments focusing on the role of employer resistance and repression, see Griffith, Crisis of American Labor
pp. 88-105, Zieger, The CIO, p. 235, and David Burgess, Fighting For Social Justice, Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 2000, pp. 73-76.
13
For the role of race in Operation Dixie, see Griffith, pp. 62-87, and Zieger, pp. 234-235, and pp. 239-240. For
a discussion of race in labor history and historiography, including a critical appraisal of the CIO’s handling of
race, see Herbert Hill, “The Problem of Race in American Labor History,” Reviews in American History, vol.
24, no. 2, 1996, pp. 189-208.
14
Nelson Lichtenstein, for example, explains the failure of Operation Dixie as the result of an “orgy of redbaiting and race-baiting” that “stopped the CIO’s postwar organizing campaign, Operation Dixie, dead in its
tracks and snuffed out the political career of many a regional liberal.” Lichtenstein, Nelson, Walter Reuther:
The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, p 257.
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racial policy served as proof positive of its communistic nature15. Southern opponents of
labor were also quick to point out that the CIO was a Northern organization, and portrayed its
representatives as “outside agitators,” only interested in Southern workers for their potential
union dues, and incapable of truly understanding Southern society.16 At the other extreme,
some historians, most notably Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein have argued that the
CIO should have championed racial equality more strongly than it did, arguing that
Operation Dixie lost an opportunity to build what Korstad has termed “civil-rights unionism”
in the South.17 Some historians, notably Griffith, have pointed to the fact that the CIO’s
commitment of manpower and money, large as it was by the standards of the time, were
clearly insufficient to the mammoth task of organizing the entire South.18 Finally, at least
one historian, Timothy Minchin, has argued that the economic prosperity that followed the
Second World War produced a situation in which Southern workers, experiencing rising
wages and an improved standard of living, simply did not consider union membership
necessary in order to achieve their economic and consumer goals, and were, indeed, leery of
joining labor unions, perceiving such an act as a potential threat to their continued
employment.19
15

As John Egerton has noted, southerners often objected to communism more on the grounds of its stances on
race and religion, than on the basis of its economic critique of capitalism, which was often either not known, or
understood. See Egerton, John, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 171.
16
Much was made, for example, of the fact that officials of the TWUA had last names like Rieve and Baldanzi.
17
Korstad, Robert and Lichtenstein, Nelson, “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early
Civil Rights Movement,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1988, pp. 786-811. See also:
Korstad, Robert Rogers, Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the MidTwentieth Century South, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003
18
Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 26.
19
Minchin, What Do We Need A Union For?, p. 48. While Minchin’s point about rising wage standards
negatively impacting the perceived need for labor unions is probably correct, the emphasis that he places upon
workers’ fear of losing material possessions is perhaps overstated. While it is true that the prospect of losing
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As with any historical phenomenon, it is difficult to exactly pinpoint causation, and
the failure of Operation Dixie was almost certainly the result of many of the factors
mentioned above. Indeed, this is the conclusion that Griffith ultimately comes to, pointing to
the role of race, religion, and employer repression, while also arguing that the CIO itself
contributed to the failure of Operation Dixie by allocating insufficient resources to the drive,
and seeking to apply “Northern” organizing techniques to a “Southern” situation, where
alternative methods were needed.20 This last explanation, that the CIO employed tactics
which, while appropriate in the North, failed to meet the unique circumstances of the South,
is Griffith’s own unique contribution to the study of Operation Dixie, and will constitute one
of the subjects which will be explored, and addressed, in the following chapters. In the
context of Griffith’s argument, the “northern methods” utilized by the CIO during Operation
Dixie comprised a strategy of targeting the largest employer in a given industry for initial
organization. This had been the tactic pursued by the CIO in their organization of the
automobile and the steel industries. By organizing General Motors, the UAW had achieved
what Griffith terms a “break-through,” after which it became easier to organize workers at
other companies. The theory behind this strategy was that once it had been demonstrated that
the union could succeed at organizing the major company within an industry, workers would
lose their fears of company reprisal, and be more ready to sign up with a union that was
clearly on the march. This formed a sort of domino theory of labor organizing, in which an
one’s car during the course of a long strike due to inability to make payments probably weighed heavily on the
minds of many workers, workers prior to the war had joined labor unions and gone on strike, risking their jobs,
housing, and future prospects of obtaining work in the textile industry. While a car might be (and was) a prized
possession, even a symbol of independence, it hardly compares to one’s very livelihood.
20
Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 169.
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initial victory would result in the rapid expansion of the union as workers at smaller firms fell
into line. While this seemed to work fairly well in the centralized, oligopolistic industries
characteristic of the North, it failed miserably when it was attempted in the South textile
industry, most notably with the Kannapolis campaign to organize Cannon Mills. Griffith’s
conclusion is that this effort to apply an organizing model which had been wildly successful
in the North, to the Southern textile industry demonstrated a fundamental lack of
understanding on the part of Operation Dixie’s leadership of the nature, and structure, of
Southern industry. One of the arguments of the current study will be that this critique may
also be applied equally well to other parts of Operation Dixie’s program for the South.
This thesis will also address a subject that has received little in-depth coverage in the
existing historiography of Southern labor: the role of religion in defeating unionization
efforts. While the fact that organized religion has often been hostile to organized labor in the
South is both well-known, and relatively well-documented, the subject has received little in
the way of extensive, in-depth analysis. The antagonism between these two institutions,
religion and labor, when noted, has often been simply acknowledged as a given, and then
dismissed. One of the novel aspects of Operation Dixie was that its organizers, rather than
simply accepting that they would be opposed by local ministers, actively sought to do
something about it. Building on outreach programs that had already been established
successfully in the North, the CIO attempted to use the Community Relations Department as
a vehicle to win over the clergy of the South to the side of the union. The efforts of the CRD,
then, would seem to constitute a prime example of what Griffith classifies as Northern
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methods, applied to a Southern situation. The fact that this effort, which had been successful
in the North, failed in the South, seems, at first glance to be confirmation of her critique. The
detailed study of the CRD then, provides a useful case study with which to test many of
Griffith’s conclusions, while at the same time exploring the relationship between religion and
labor in the South, a subject that is both highly complex, and relatively little studied. It is, by
no means, the intention of this paper to argue that religion was the primary factor in the
failure of Operation Dixie, but it seems clear that the opposition of ministers, churches, and
evangelists did play some role in persuading workers to stay out of the union. While Ray
Marshall is probably correct in arguing that the extent to which religion was important in the
defeat of the CIO in the South is impossible to determine, it is possible to say that religion
had a role to play in this defeat, a role that is deserving of further, detailed, study.21
In a sense, the fact that the CIO was opposed by the religious leaders of the South
should not be surprising. The Church, as with other social elites in the South, tended to
identify with the interests of business when it came to unions. Church opposition was of a
piece with the wider antagonism to the CIO expressed by other civic leaders ranging from
chambers of commerce to newspaper editors, and including prominent doctors, lawyers, and
private citizens. The New South vision, which emphasized the importance of industry to the
emergence of the South as a prosperous and successful region, ready to take its place
alongside the rest of the nation, viewed growth of industry as absolutely essential, and
consequently tended to treat labor unions as a potential threat to this new-found economic
21

Marshall, F. Ray, Labor in the South, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. (Sorry, I don’t have
the exact page number for this citation, as I don’t own a copy of this text, and I haven’t had a chance to check it
out of the library yet this term. Will remedy this shortly.)
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prosperity.22 The civic leaders of the South were not prepared to countenance any
developments that might upset their ability to attract, and retain, industry, and thus tended to
be hostile when faced with the possibility of the South becoming a union stronghold. One of
the principle reasons that the South was appealing to industry was, after all, its tradition of
cheap, non-union, labor. Many of the textile factories that had sprung up around the South in
the first half of the twentieth century were owned by firms that were fleeing the high-wage
North, where textile unions were most heavily represented. Should these unions establish a
presence in the South, it was feared, manufacturers would no longer have an incentive to
relocate their operations, and the South would lose its competitive advantage in attracting
industry. Church leaders who, along with other local elites, tended to share in this vision of
civic boosterism, and who viewed their role in terms of promoting the fortunes of the
community as a whole, were predisposed to be hostile to the CIO. Moreover, as Liston Pope
has demonstrated in his classic account of the Gastonia strike of 1929, Millhands and
Preachers, many ministers in industrial towns enjoyed a lucrative patronage relationship with
local manufacturers, a situation that would tend to mitigate against their willingness to
support unions opposed by employers.23
And yet, in many ways, churches seemed to be a natural ally for the labor movement.
While the heyday of the Social Gospel may have passed with the end of the Progressive Era,
its influence was still felt among many ministers who championed the interests of the poor
22

For an in-depth treatment of the New South ideology, see Gaston, Paul, The New South Creed: A Study In
Southern Mythmaking, Random House, 1970.
23
Pope, Liston, Millhands and Preachers, A Study of Gastonia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942, pp.
143-161.
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and the downtrodden. Several denominations, most prominently the Roman Catholic
Church, had officially endorsed the right of workers to join unions and engage in collective
bargaining. Moreover, the CIO had received help on occasion from ministers in the North
during strikes and contract negotiations, assistance that had illustrated the advantages of
religious support in dealing with employers.24 Despite accusations that the CIO was a
godless, atheistic, and communistic outfit, many of the top leaders within the organization
were, themselves, deeply religious,25 and indeed many within the labor movement felt that
their work on behalf of organized labor was an outgrowth, and expression, of their
commitment to the teachings of the gospel. Finally, the South was not without its own
tradition of socially progressive religious activism, although this constituted, by and large, a
marginal thread within the larger fabric of conservative Southern Protestantism.26 For all of
these reasons, there was some hope that a constructive relationship with Southern clergy
could be established.
The attempt to form such a relationship forms the subject of this research. More
specifically, the subject that will be examined will be the Community Relations Department
of the CIO, and its mission of outreach to the clergy of the South. The organizers of
Operation Dixie knew that community support would be essential to the success of the
24

For a discussion of Catholicism and the CIO in the context of Detroit, including the role played by the
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) in the UAW, see Lichtenstein, Nelson, Walter Reuther: The
Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, pp. 187-189.
25
Although it is perhaps worth noting that many of these leaders, including CIO president Phil Murray, were
Roman Catholics, a denomination not heavily represented in the South as a whole, and practically negligible
among textile workers.
26
See for example Fannin, Mark, Labor's Promised Land: Radical Visions of Gender, Race, and Religion in the
South, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2003, which analyzes the development of alternative religious
understandings of Southern society within the Brotherhood of Timber Workers and the Southern Tenant
Farmers Union.
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Southern Organizing Drive. It was out of consideration for local sensibilities, for example,
that Operation Dixie’s first director, Van Bittner, made the decision to exclude known
communists from the ranks of Operation Dixie organizers, and to focus on recruiting World
War Two veterans and native Southerners as organizers for the campaign. Indeed, Bittner
went so far as to publicly repudiate the long-standing relationship between the CIO and the
Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW,) an organization of Southern liberals that
had been accused (falsely) of being a communist front organization.27 The plan for Operation
Dixie was to play down the northern base of the CIO, and the union federation’s policies on
racial equality and liberal political activism, in order to present themselves in a more
appealing light to Southerners. While the success of these attempts is ultimately questionable
in light of the drive’s results, they nonetheless indicate the lengths to which the CIO was
willing to go in order to make the drive a success.
When, in the early days of the campaign, organizer’s reports began to filter in citing
the role of local clergy opposition as a reason for representation election defeats, the CIO
leadership took these reports seriously. The South has long been identified as one of the
most religious regions in the country28, and the role of the local minister in small mill towns
throughout the South was an important one. Among highly religious Southern workers, the
opposition of the clergy to unionization could be a significant impediment to the work of
union organizers. In order to address this challenge, the CIO created the Community
27

Egerton, John, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South,
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p. 444.
28
Matthews, Donald, “We Have Left Undone Those Things Which We Ought To Have Done: Southern
Religious History in Retrospect and Prospect,” Church History, Vol. 67, No. 2, 1998, p. 305.
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Relations Department (CRD) headed by a Presbyterian layman, and United Steel Workers of
America official, John Gates Ramsay.29 Ramsay had previous experience working with local
clergy, most notably during the USWA’s victorious unionization campaign in Buffalo, New
York.30 Because of this past experience, as well as Ramsay’s long history of active
involvement in a variety of religious and community service organizations31, he was
considered to be well qualified for the job of serving as the CIO’s liaison with Southern
churchmen.
Two fellow CIO staffers who aided Ramsay in this work were Lucy Randolph Mason
and David Burgess. Mason who had been working for the CIO since the mid 1930’s, was a
powerful asset to the union for several reasons. A dedicated and determined advocate of the
interests of working people, Lucy Randolph Mason had been active in progressive causes for
decades by the time of Operation Dixie.32 By the time that the Southern Organizing Drive
was launched, Mason was an elderly, white-haired lady, whose grandmotherly looks were
often deceptive. Although always refined and genteel, Mason was a tireless and fiery activist
who, though much more polite than Mother Jones, the famous labor agitator and “miner’s
friend,” lacked none of her zeal or dedication. In addition to her labor credentials, Mason
also had the advantage of belonging to one of the most distinguished families of Virginia.

29

Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 110.
Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth and Fones-Wolf, Ken, ”Conversion At Bethlehem: Religion and Union Building in
Steel, 1930-42, Labor History, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1998, p. 381.
31
For a more extensive overview of John Ramsay’s life and career, see Abrams, Brian, John Ramsay and the
Evolution of Church- Labor Relations in the CIO, M.A. Thesis, Georgia State University, 1985.
32
Prior to working for the CIO, Mason had been the general secretary of the Richmond YWCA, and later the
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Related to both the Masons and the Randolphs, she was also a relative of General Robert E.
Lee, and counted Chief Justice John Marshall as one of her forebears.33 In short, Mason
added a good deal of legitimacy and credibility to the CIO as it moved into the South. David
Burgess, who worked with Ramsay in addition to his other duties as an organizer in towns
such as Rock Hill, South Carolina, was a recent graduate of Union Theological Seminary,
and an ordained Congregationalist minister, and, as such, was uniquely situated to aid
Ramsay in his efforts to cultivate the religious leadership of the South.34
Working with Mason and Burgess, John Ramsay lead the Community Relations
Department’s efforts to combat the opposition of local ministers to the CIO organizing
campaign, and to recruit labor-friendly clergy to bestow the blessings of organized religion
on the efforts of organized labor. As with Operation Dixie more generally, it is difficult to
see the efforts of the CRD as notably successful. While it is admittedly difficult to quantify
the results of a campaign to win the hearts and minds of working people, it is clear that the
CRD did not make the difference in the CIO’s efforts to unionize Southern workers.
Moreover, while Ramsay was able to recruit some progressive ministers to the cause of
organized labor, and was able to set up Religion and Labor Fellowship groups in various
locales, it is by no means clear that these efforts did much to reduce the general opposition
among ministers to the CIO. Again the reasons for this failure, as with the Southern
Organizing Drive in general, are many and varied. In the pages that follow, some of these
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reasons will be explored, and explanations will be offered, some of them strategic, and some
of them more philosophical in nature.
One of the prominent themes which will emerge in this analysis, hearkening back to
Griffith’s critique concerning the use of “Northern methods,” is the issue of what might be
termed the CIO’s “cultural competence” when it came to Southern society. To what extent
was the CRD’s approach to dealing with Southern clergy a realistic one, given the nature,
structure, and societal role of Southern religion? Did Ramsay’s attempts to reach local
ministers reflect an understanding of organized religion and ecclesiastical structure more
reflective of Northern conditions, than of the region in which he was working? There are
several compelling reasons to think that this might well have been the case, and as the record
of the CRD is explored, these are among the primary issues to which we will be returning.
Before the CRD’s failings can be analyzed, however, its actual record must be
examined, and the first four chapters of this study will be devoted to this task. The first
chapter will provide a general historical background dealing with the development and
general shape of religion in the South, along with a more detailed history of the Community
Relations Department, the reasons for its creation, its mission, and its activities. Having laid
the basic groundwork for a more in-depth study, the next three chapters will explore the
actual work of the CRD. While the work of the CRD was quite varied, its main endeavors
can be divided into three rough categories.
The first of these has to do with the efforts of Ramsay and his colleagues to answer
the religious critics of the CIO in their own language. These efforts were directed towards
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the compilation of arguments, based on the Bible, and on the pronouncements of various
denominational bodies, on the subject of organized labor, that supported the cause of labor
and sanctioned the joining of unions. These arguments were issued in the form of various
pamphlets and leaflets that were distributed to local ministers and lay people. In addition to
written communication, both Ramsay and Mason devoted much of their time during these
years to public speaking, touring the South speaking to various ministerial alliances in the
towns in which the CIO was attempting to mount organizing drives. These efforts, along
with a critique of their effectiveness, and an analysis of their results, will form the basis of
chapter two.
Chapter three will encompass the second area in which the CRD focused its efforts,
and indeed the effort that was its signature program: the creation of local Religion and Labor
Fellowship groups. These groups were designed to bring together religious and labor leaders
in a friendly, and ostensibly neutral, environment for luncheons and lectures, in which issues
of concern to the two groups could be discussed. It was hoped that through these meetings a
more convivial environment could be created for organizing efforts, that useful friendships,
or at the least working relationships, could be created, and mutual understanding fostered.
Ramsay was always convinced that the relationship between religion and labor was both
natural, and mutually beneficial. Indeed, Ramsay’s own commitment to organized labor was,
in part, an outgrowth of his profound religious convictions, and he felt that labor and religion
were natural allies in carrying out the social vision of the gospels. In setting up Religion and
Labor Fellowship groups, Ramsay’s goal was to bring these two forces – religion and labor –
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together for their mutual benefit. Particular attention will be paid here to the social, religious,
and class backgrounds of the clerical representatives recruited by Ramsay for these groups,
and what effect, if any, this might have had on their efficacy in promoting the efforts of the
CIO organizing campaign.
A final arena in which the CRD operated, and the topic which will be considered in
chapter four, was in refuting the claims of, and seeking to correct the damage done by,
religiously oriented newspapers that attacked the CIO and attempted to persuade workers that
joining a CIO union would be a violation of their Christian faith. The two most prominent
such newspapers were The Trumpet and The Militant Truth. Both newspapers were
consistent thorns in the side of the CIO in its attempt to organize the South. These
newspapers, reportedly financed by Southern manufacturers, denounced the CIO as godless,
communistic, and immoral, and were frequently cited by union organizers as a factor in
union election defeats.35 These newspapers, particularly The Militant Truth often found their
way to worker’s mailboxes just prior to union elections, and many within the CIO suspected
(with good cause) that this was not coincidental.36 The consistent message of these
newspapers was that Christian workers could not be both good Christians and members of a
labor union – that they must choose sides, one way or another. Considering the deeply held
religious convictions of many Southern workers, it seems likely that these appeals were taken
seriously, and held the potential of swaying already wavering workers to vote against the
35
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CIO. Regardless of the actual efficacy of these newspapers in defeating organizing drives,
they were clearly perceived as damaging by Ramsay and his colleagues, who devoted a good
deal of their time and efforts towards discrediting these papers. One particularly interesting
episode in these ongoing endeavors concerns the well-known evangelist Billy Graham, one
of whose sermons appeared in the pages of the Militant Truth. Although Graham claimed
that the article appeared without his permission, he refused to denounce the newspaper, much
to the chagrin of Lucy Randolph Mason, whose correspondence with Graham forms one of
the more interesting episodes in the career of the CRD.
Having surveyed the various programs of the Community Relations Department, the
concluding chapter of this study will constitute and overall examination of the effectiveness
of these efforts and attempt to explain their successes and failures. While this analysis will,
naturally, tend to revolve around issues of strategy and technique, there will also be a more
philosophical component, dealing with issues of movement culture, internal democracy, and
the rhetoric of social movements. This discussion is informed by, and deeply indebted to,
work done by Lawrence Goodwyn and Michael Kazin on the nature, and rhetorical language,
of social movements in general, and populist movements in particular. While it is perhaps
not advisable to read too much into the history of this one department, it is perhaps possible
to gain, through looking at the relations between the CIO and Southern churches, some
insight into the nature, and the direction, of the labor movement more broadly. Particularly
relevant to this study will be the ongoing critique of the CIO that emphasizes a purported
shift within that organization to a more “respectable and responsible” type of “business”
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unionism, characterized by increased bureaucracy and hierarchical structure, in the aftermath
of World War II.37 There has been much criticism of the CIO, mostly focused upon largely
Northern unions such as the UAW and the USWA, that argues that, by the 1940s, the unions
had become increasingly bureaucratic, and less concerned with the needs and desires of its
rank-and-file membership than with forming a collegial working relationship with
governmental and business elites. Perhaps not surprisingly however, little attention has been
given to how this transformation might have affected the CIO’s organizing efforts in the
South. For example, does the very structure of the CRD’s efforts to win over Southern
clergy, themselves members of a civic elite, rather than build upon autonomous workingclass understandings of religion and labor, reflect a larger institutional culture that was
seeking to achieve an accommodation with the larger society, rather than engaging in the
confrontational style of working class assertiveness that supposedly characterized the early
years of the CIO? These are the sorts of issues that will be considered in the concluding
section of this study. While there are, perhaps, no definitive answers to these questions, they
are important because they address the very central question of the nature, and purpose, of
labor unions themselves. Are unions simply a way for workers to improve their wages,
hours, and conditions—the sort of “bread and butter” unionism espoused by Samuel
Gompers, or are they something more, a vehicle for the transformation of society itself?
Again while no definitive answers are perhaps possible, perhaps this discussion will, at the
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least, add an interesting angle to the continuing debate over the changing nature of the CIO
as a democratic social movement as the labor confederation moved into the post-war period.
In a time when the relationship between progressive politics and Protestant
fundamentalist religion has once again become a subject of intense interest, the experiences
of the Community Relations Department are of renewed relevance. As Michael Kazin has
pointed out in his history of populism, The Populist Persuasion, populism and evangelical
Christianity, intimately intertwined during the nineteenth century, have diverged significantly
during the twentieth.38 John Ramsay’s efforts were, in many ways, an attempt to reconnect
these historic partners under the umbrella of an insurgent labor movement. That these efforts
ultimately failed is significant, and worthy of further study. On the face of it, Southern
workers had much to gain in the 1940s and 50s by joining with the CIO, and yet they, by and
large, did not choose to do so. Admittedly, there were many factors at work in this outcome,
not the least of which was the active opposition and repression exercised by Southern
employers. But one factor, frequently cited by organizers, was the element of religious
disapproval directed towards organized labor.
Twenty-first century observers have noted that working-class people often act against
their perceived economic interests because of religion. This is not a new phenomenon.
People act on the basis of a wide variety of motivations. While to those who tend to view the
world in economic terms, the idea that race or religion might sometimes trump class may be
puzzling, it is, nonetheless, empirically true. If Thomas Frank can ask “what’s the matter
38
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with Kansas,” at the beginning of the twenty-first century, so might labor historians studying
Operation Dixie ask what’s the matter with South Carolina? Or, for that matter, with the
South in general? And the answer is, in part, religion. Religion, and more specifically the
vocal opposition of Southern clergy to the CIO during Operation Dixie, was one of the many
weapons within the arsenal of those who opposed the expansion of the CIO into Southern
industry. The CIO attempted to counter this opposition with a sustained effort to win the
support of Southern clergy. For many reasons, which this study will seek to examine, this
effort was not, ultimately, successful, but the fact that it was tried at all is quite interesting
and revealing. Even more interesting is the actual story of the Community Relations
Department and the work that they did during this crucial period of post-war labor expansion.
The efforts of the CRD form a tale replete with historical possibilities, tantalizing prospects,
and consistent frustrations. What follows is an attempt to make sense of that story.
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Chapter Two: The Big Picture Argument
In the introduction, several theories concerning the failure of Operation Dixie were
discussed. Although there is much merit in many of these theories, almost all of them are
lacking in one way or another. Whether placing the blame for Operation Dixie’s failure on
the southern workers whom the CIO was attempting to organize, or upon the employers who
resisted organizing efforts, or even upon impersonal economic forces which combined to
lessen the appeal of the CIO’s pitch, what most of these explanations have in common is that
the place the blame for the CIO’s failure everywhere but with the CIO itself. This approach
is not entirely wrong, per se, and indeed, there is quite a lot of truth to the argument that
external forces played a decisive role in the failure of Operation Dixie. Indeed, the use of
extra-legal violence and official repression against union organizers, coupled with the failure
of the Federal government to aggressively enforce the provisions of the existing labor law,
combined, in large part, to make the success of the campaign well-nigh impossible. And yet,
by focusing purely on external factors, it is impossible to see the complete picture, and a key
factor is overlooked.
To be sure, there have been some criticisms of the CIO here and there. Griffith points
out, quite correctly, that the CIO should have devoted more resources, both in terms of
money and manpower, towards the organizing effort.39 Other historians, notably Robert
Korstad, suggest that the CIO mistakenly wasted its organizing efforts on white textile
workers, rather than black industrial workers who would have been more receptive to the
39
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CIO and more likely to join one of its unions.40 Finally, some observers have criticized the
CIO for failing to make use of experienced Communist Party members whose organizing
experience was unparalleled, and who had proven their worth in earlier organizing efforts in
the North.41 Unfortunately, none of these arguments are particularly convincing, nor do any
of them tell the whole story.
It is true that the Operation Dixie was under-funded, especially considering the
geographical size of its organizing arena, and the sheer numbers of workers that it was set to
recruit. However, it is hard to think of any union organizing campaign, ever, which has been
adequately funded. Union organizers work under perpetually unfavorable conditions, and yet
have, at other times, and in other places, somehow managed to muddle through. A lack of
resources can, at best, only partially explain the failure of Operation Dixie’s organizers.42
The other two arguments are even less compelling. While it is true that black workers were,
on the whole, much more likely to join CIO unions, focusing on organizing in black
dominated industries would have made little impact on the overall economy of the south.
The largest industry in the southern economy, far and away, was the textile industry, which
was almost completely white. Historically, black workers had been excluded from all but the
most marginal employment in the textile industry, a situation that would not begin to change
40
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until the 1960s. Moreover, the likely result of focusing on organizing black workers would
have been to alienate white textile workers, workers who were often racist themselves, and
who benefited economically and socially from the system of white supremacy.43 While
organizing black workers might have been a morally correct thing to do, it would not have
led to the fundamental economic change in the southern economy that the CIO was seeking.
Finally, given the ideological climate of the South in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it is
difficult to see how employing communist cadre organizers would have been anything other
than a complete disaster. Even downplaying their past connections with members of the CP,
the CIO was subject to relentless red-baiting during the course of Operation Dixie, a situation
that would have been even worse had the CIO fielded actual communists as organizers.44
What all of these explanations miss, I will argue, is the central fact that the CIO failed
to offer southern workers a compelling reason to join a union during the course of Operation
Dixie. This is not to say that compelling reasons did not exist, as they certainly did.
Southern workers, compared to their counterparts in the North, were paid less, worked more,
and had much less of a say in their working conditions. Even more fundamentally, southern
workers lacked societal respect and social and economic power. From being derided as “lint
heads” to standing powerless before the company’s decision to decrease its workforce,
increase production, or lower wages, southern workers were very clearly the junior partner in
the power relationship that characterized southern industry. The irony, of course, is that this
43
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is precisely the situation to which the CIO had addressed itself to in the North, with its
promotion of “industrial democracy,” aiming to give workers a voice in their workplaces. In
the North, through the achievement of contracts that guaranteed seniority, a strong system of
shop stewards, and a grievance procedure, this power imbalance had been, if not wholly
rectified, at the least noticeably reduced.
What is notable about the Southern Organizing Drive, and what, ultimately, ensured
its failure, was the omission of this vision for economic democracy from the recruiting pitch
of the CIO. To a remarkable degree the organizers of Operation Dixie limited their appeal to
the traditional “bread and butter” issues of unionism: wages, hours and conditions. The
problem with this approach was two-fold. In the first place, basic economic issues were not a
burning concern among Southern workers in the years just after World War II. Wages,
although lower than the going rate in the north, were increasing, and were good by the
standards of the Southern economy. As Timothy Minchin has pointed out, southern workers
were doing much better economically, both in terms of wages and in terms of access to
consumer goods, than ever before.45 Secondly, by limiting its appeal to the economic plane,
the CIO made it fairly easy for employers to rebut its argument that workers had to join a
union if they wanted their finances to improve. Employers in the post-war era demonstrated
a willingness to raise wages in order to avoid unionization of their workforces. In effect, if
workers could get a pay raise without joining a union, they perceived little need to stick their
necks out by signing a union card. Employers utilized a sort of carrot and stick approach to
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thwarting unionization. One the one hand, they offered to raise wages on their own, and on
the other, they threatened dire consequences if their workers insisted on joining a union,
including the prospect of shutting down the plant completely.46 Moreover, southern workers
were well aware of the recent past, when union organizing campaigns and strikes, notably the
1934 General Textile Strike, had resulted in violence and bloodshed, often the result of
employer’s use of armed guards and militia.47 In effect, by limiting their appeal to simply
economic issues, the CIO was asking southern workers to risk their jobs, perhaps even their
lives, for a pay raise that they could usually get without even joining the union. Simply put,
it is possible to convince a person to risk his or her life and well-being for a grand ideal, a
vision of a better, more just society, but it is not possible to convince a person to risk it all for
a fifteen cent per hour pay raise. By downplaying the vision of fundamental social change
that had characterized the vibrant early CIO in its northern phase, Operation Dixie was
asking southern workers to put it all on the line for very little in terms of tangible,
perceptible, benefit.
What this strategy reveals is a fundamental incompatibility between the goals of the
CIO in Operation Dixie and its methodology. The goals of the CIO, to unionize the South in
order to protect its northern unions, shift the political makeup of Congress to the left, and
secure the gains made by the union during World War Two and the New Deal, required
nothing less than massive social change, change that would remake the whole character of
the South. This vision represented a degree of social change that simply could not be
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achieved through a run-of-the-mill organizing campaign. Just as the later Civil Rights
Movement required a level of organizing and commitment that reached well beyond merely
organizing new local branches of the NAACP, so would the restructuring of southern society
and the southern economy require more than simply organizing local unions.
As Lawrence Goodwyn has pointed out in his landmark history of the Populist
Movement, The Populist Moment, change does not occur simply because it is needed, or
because “times are hard.” Indeed, throughout human history, times have often been hard,
and yet meaningful social change is a relatively rare phenomenon.48 Rather, Goodwyn
asserts, social change comes about as a result of the hard work of social movements,
movements that, in response to a perceived need for change among its members, proceed to
organize, educate, and agitate for change. Social movements are, fundamentally, movements
that oppose the existing status quo, what Goodwyn terms the “received culture,” a culture
that we are all a part of, and whose rules we have all internalized and been socialized to
accept. The received culture is made up of cultural assumptions about power, who possesses
it, and what uses it may legitimately be put to. Out of these assumptions grow hierarchies of
social power and position, what Goodwyn terms “patterns of deference.” Those segments of
society that benefit from this hierarchical system of power and deference, naturally are keen
to preserve their traditional status, and thus tend to oppose moves towards change. The role
of a social movement then, in Goodwyn’s theory, is first, to educate its members as to the
realities of power relations within the received culture, and secondly, through the creation of
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self-respect and political self-confidence, to struggle against these inherited patterns of
deference so that social change can be achieved.49
In light of this analysis of the means and ends of social change, and social reform
movements, it rapidly becomes clear how the CIO went astray in its attempts to organize the
South in Operation Dixie. The CIO, which had fulfilled the function of a social movement
during its early organizational phase in the North, had abandoned many of these key
elements by the time it came south in 1946. There are several reasons why this was so.
Robert Zieger has argued that the leaders of the CIO were, primarily, not radicals at all, but
more or less practical union leaders who were concerned with the well-being of their
membership above and beyond any vision of achieving radical changes in society.50 On the
whole, and particularly as it relates to Philip Murray, who headed the Congress of Industrial
Organizations throughout the period of Operation Dixie, this is probably a correct
assessment.51 And yet, the CIO had accomplished a series of radical changes in the power
relations that characterized northern industry by the end of the Second World War. When
one compares the situation in, for example, automobile manufacturing prior to 1937 with that
prevailing a decade later, it is hard not to conclude that the CIO had fundamentally
transformed labor-management relations. More importantly, this change was accomplished
49
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by challenging, head-on, the received work culture prevailing at employers such as General
Motors, demonstrating that, at least early on, the CIO had been willing to confront and
contest the cultural assumptions that supported northern industry.
At some point, during the Second World War, or perhaps a few years earlier, a
perceptible shift began to occur in the attitude of the CIO towards society. Nelson
Lichtenstein, among others, has argued that the CIO, beginning with its involvement with
New Deal agencies, particularly the National Labor Relations Board, and increasing through
its cooperation with the Roosevelt administration during the course of the war, reached a sort
of accommodation with government power through which it became a partner with the
government in insuring social and economic stability.52 On the one hand, this served to
provide protection to the CIO at a vulnerable stage of its existence against the attacks of its
enemies in the business community, while on the other hand it served the interest that the
government had in stability, by constraining the CIO in its freedom to advance its interests
through the use of socially, and economically disruptive strikes. Whether one views this
bargain as wise and practical, or as a Faustian sell-out, the result was to give the CIO much
more of a practical stake in preserving the status quo than it otherwise would have had.
Some additional consideration should be given to the quite remarkably changed ideological
climate of the mid 1940s as opposed to that which had prevailed during the Great
Depression. With the passing of Roosevelt from the political scene, the end of the war, and
with the political and cultural shift to the right which marked the years immediately
52
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following the end of the war, radicalism of any stripe was decidedly less acceptable to the
society at large. In this climate, the CIO became increasingly concerned with projecting an
image of itself as a mature and “responsible” labor union, a body that was dedicated to
preserving and defending the American way of life. To all of the preceding factors must be
added the fact that Philip Murray was himself a much more practical, and a much less
flamboyant, leader than his predecessor, John L. Lewis, a man who may be charitably
characterized as a bit of a maverick.
Finally, and this is a factor whose importance to the outcome of Operation Dixie was
to be pivotal, was the perception among the planners of Operation Dixie, particularly its
director, Van Bittner, that it was important to modify the image of the CIO in such as way as
to not offend the sensibilities of southerners. As Douglas Flamming has argued, this attitude
“suggests one of the major problems with the drive – namely, that the CIO’s national leaders
viewed the South as a different country.53” In some ways, no doubt, the South did represent
an organizing challenge different, and distinct, from that of the North. For example, southern
industry, particularly in textiles, was structured quite differently from that in the North, and
issues of race certainly played a more prominent role in southern society, and in southern
industry than was the case in the North. However, the CIO’s perceptions of the differentness
of the South, and southern culture went much further than this. In general, southern workers
were viewed with a fair amount of suspicion and often out-right condescension. Several
years prior to Operation Dixie, Solomon Barkin, the research director for the TWUA had
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written "the Southern Textile Worker is a small-town, suspicious individual, who is
extremely provincial, petty, gossip-mongering, who is completely isolated and knows only
his mill.54” This perception of southern workers, coupled with the generally conservative
social climate of the post-war period, seemed to suggest that the CIO would not get very far
with the militant approach that it had used in the North. It was with this consideration in
mind that Bittner made the decision to avoid controversy by severing any association
between Operation Dixie and the CIO’s Political Action Committee (PAC,) excluding known
or suspected communists from the ranks of Operation Dixie organizers, downplaying the
CIO’s position on race and civil rights, and, to the extent possible, using native white
southerners as organizers.
Unfortunately, by seeking to strip Operation Dixie of anything that could even
remotely be considered controversial or inflammatory, the CIO effectively removed that
element of challenging the received culture that made the CIO a social movement with a
powerful vision of social change. It is perhaps easier to perceive this process in retrospect
than it was at the time. No doubt the planners of Operation Dixie perceived their efforts as a
practical approach to dealing with a regional culture that was much less friendly towards the
idea of industrial unionism than was the North. And, indeed, some of these decisions, such
as the decision to proceed cautiously on the issue of race, were probably wise ones.
Unfortunately, the net result was a campaign that was so intent on appearing non-threatening
that it was unable to present a truly coherent view of the problems of southern industrial life,
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or an alternative social vision that was capable of engaging and attracting potential new
members.
Prior to 1946, southern workers had demonstrated, in the strikes of 1929 and 1934,
that they were receptive to visions of a re-ordered set of economic and social relations that
would provide them with dignity, a voice in their workplace, and more power in their
relationship with their employer. The great resentment against the stretch-out system that
prompted the General Strike in 1934 was a reflection of more than simply economic
concerns, it reflected a deep dissatisfaction with the prevailing industrial culture of the textile
south, in which workers stood helpless before the demands of management for increased
production at whatever the cost.
The prevailing view in southern labor history for many years was that there was
something in the nature of the southern worker, some personality trait, some defect of
culture, that explained why the south didn’t have labor unions. Thanks to a generation of
historians who have studied labor in the South over the past twenty or so years, we now
know that southerners, on the whole, were no less class conscious, or incapable of
understanding the logic of union than any other set of workers, and indeed, that they
possessed a great deal of agency in shaping both their own lives, and the development of
southern industry.55 In this era of post-exceptionalism56, it is no longer sufficient to place all
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of the responsibility for the failure of unions to take hold in the south upon southern workers.
Instead, we must cast our net a little further afield in order to understand this central
phenomenon of southern economic history. While there is no one, easy answer, it seems
clear that at least one factor is the failure of the labor movement itself to present its case
compellingly. It is not the intent of this work to present a grand master explanation that
covers the entirety of southern labor history, but rather to argue that, for this one, important,
episode in the economic history of the south, one of the major reasons for the failure of
unionism was the union itself. Through pitching its case almost entirely upon the plane of
bread-and-butter economic issues, while neglecting the larger duties of a social movement to
identify cultural assumptions harmful to its constituents, to educate its members, both present
and prospective, upon the issues, and to agitate for change through confronting traditional
patterns of deference and oppression, the CIO doomed its efforts to attract members and
placed itself in a position of perceived irrelevancy.
The sad spectacle that too often emerges from this situation is of an insurgent social
movement that, by seeking to appear as something it is not, finds itself in the awkward
position of seeking to mobilize the very pillars of the existing social hierarchy in order to
achieve social change antagonistic to its own interests. Such, for instance, is the basic reality
of the CIO attempting to convince employers that they should cooperate with the union in
order to achieve a stable workforce, regimented by a “responsible” and “mature” industrial
union. Again, we have the incongruous picture of organizers in the factory town of
Kannapolis, North Carolina, careful not to speak too harshly of Charles Cannon, the
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paternalistic operator of Cannon Mills, in order not to offend his cowed workers. Perhaps the
most glaring example of this tendency was the decision to exclude PAC work from Operation
Dixie. To a very great extent, the existing political structure of the South, with its limited
franchise and concentration of political power in the hands of a tiny economic and social
elite, was highly implicated in the perpetuation of an oppressive economic regime, a regime
that victimized the very workers that the CIO was attempting to organize. Moreover, given
that one of the central purposes of Operation Dixie was to lay the basis for a political
transformation of the South, the decision to exclude political work from the campaign is
more than a little puzzling. To make the decision to ignore this factor, in order to avoid
controversy, seems to ignore the very basis of the problem.57
One of the most glaring failures of this type, and the subject of the present work, is
the project of the Community Relations Department under John Gates Ramsay. The mission
of the CRD seemed straightforward enough, in brief it was designed to deal with criticism of
Operation Dixie on the part of local religious leaders who often sought to sway their
congregations against joining with the CIO. The manner in which Ramsay sought to achieve
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this mission, however, reflects many of the problems already identified in the approach of
Operation Dixie as a whole. The following chapters will explore in some detail how Ramsay
proceeded. The general conclusion that this study finds is that, in addition to a variety of
tactical and strategic blunders (which illustrated Ramsay’s lack of understanding of the very
nature of southern religion, and the structure of the major denominations represented in the
South) Ramsay’s approach was fundamentally anti-thetical to the methods and aims of a
social movement. What Ramsay attempted to do, with the best intentions imaginable, no
doubt, was to mobilize a segment of the existing power structure dominating southern society
against its very own vested interests. It is essential in this regard to recognize that the
religious leadership of the South did not represent the figure of a disinterested bystander in
the contest between the CIO and southern manufacturers. Rather, southern religious leaders
were, themselves, members of a civic elite, power brokers in their own right, who had played
a role in the boosterism which made possible the growth of southern industry, had close ties,
both social, and economic, with southern industrialists, and who had, in short, a powerful
stake in maintaining the status quo.58 In attempting to interest religious civic leaders in the
campaign of the CIO, a campaign, which, if effective, would have undermined the inherited
power and privilege of these very same civic leaders, Ramsay was, at best, illustrating a
fundamental misperception of the social realities of the South, and, at worst, undermining the
very cause which he was attempting to further. That Ramsay was ultimately unsuccessful in
wooing this section of the civic elite to endorse the cause of industrial unionism is not
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particularly surprising. What is tragic, however, is the waste of effort that this project
represented, particularly when it is apprehended that Ramsay’s considerable talents could
have been better utilized in seeking to marshal that portion of southern religious sentiment
that could very well have been beneficial to the cause of the CIO.
Although the nature of Southern religion will be explored in greater depth and detail
in the following chapters, it is worth noting at this point that there are multiple streams which
make up Christianity in the South, as indeed there are in all regions. One of these facets of
Southern religion, and one that could have proven extraordinarily helpful to the CIO in
combating the opposition it received from more institutional churches, is what may be termed
“prophetic Christianity.” It is this prophetic strain of southern religion, with its heavy
emphasis on social justice, equality, and the rights of the poor and oppressed, which
characterized the non-violent Civil Rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s, and which,
indeed, has a deep history in the South as a whole. While this variety of Christianity is most
famous, perhaps, in connection with the struggle for Black equality and civil rights, it is a
tradition that is, by no means, limited to the African-American churches of the south. On the
contrary, this tradition is one common to both races, and one which has served as a powerful
motivating factor in a variety of Southern economic and political struggles.59 With its
disregard for social hierarchy and insistence that “God is no respecter of persons60,” this is a
style of religious thought that seems tailor-made for the counter-hegemonic vision that must
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be present to provide inspiration and motivation for a movement dedicated to social change.
That this source of potential strength was not tapped by the CIO, which instead attempted to
mobilize existing patterns of deference and authority by appealing to established ministers
and churches represents perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the Community Relations
project of the CIO.61
Although it is to be hoped for that the argument outlined here, in its general form, will
become increasingly clear as it is applied concretely to specific instances in the following
chapters, it will, perhaps, be useful to address a few possible misconceptions regarding my
argument here, at the outset. Most importantly, it must be stressed that this is not a singlefactor analysis of the failure of Operation Dixie. I am not attempting to prove that the
tactical approach adopted by the Community Relations Department played a decisive role in
the failure of CIO organizers to gain recruits during their organizing campaigns. Rather, in
using the CRD as a case study, I am attempting to illustrate a deeper, underlying, pattern, one
that I argue characterized the conduct of Operation Dixie as a whole. While similar
arguments could well be made focusing on other aspects of the campaign, the role of PAC
activity, for example, the history of the CRD represents an aspect of Operation Dixie that has
been little studied, and which, I believe, forms an interesting chapter in the story of Operation
Dixie as a whole.
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Further, while I strongly believe that the general attitude towards the South that this
policy reflects contributed to the ultimate failure of Operation Dixie, I readily concede that it
was not the sole factor in the campaign’s failure. It is, indeed, quite likely that even had the
CIO adopted the attitude of an insurgent social movement, challenging the hierarchy and
power structure of the South, that the campaign would have failed, perhaps more quickly,
and more miserably that it, in fact, did. Perhaps, when one considers the sheer amount of
repression and stubborn opposition that the CIO was met with, by employers, civic groups,
terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, and by state and local government, the
campaign might have failed even more spectacularly.
What I am arguing, however, is that by failing to elaborate a clear and compelling
counter-hegemonic vision of social change for the South, the CIO precluded itself from ever
having a realistic chance at achieving its goals. By limiting its appeal to basic economic
issues such as wage increases, while failing to explain the implications of unions for the
fundamental economic and social structure of the South, the CIO, in effect, gave southern
workers, cognizant of the repression and hostility that they would face just by joining a
union, very little reason to make the momentous decision to cast their lot with organized
labor. People simply do not join social movements, and stay with them, for small
adjustments in the status quo, particularly not when these adjustments may be gained in a
more painless fashion. By focusing so narrowly on the issue of wages, and downplaying the
socially transformative implications of unionization, the CIO made it possible for employers
to effectively counter their efforts by granting small wage increases to their employees, a
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form of insurance against unionization which has, indeed, characterized much of industrial
practice for many decades. Again, although the articulation of an expansive vision for social
change may not have insured the success of Operation Dixie, the lack of one certainly
hampered any possibility that the plan may have had for success. In much the same way, as
we will see in the coming chapters, the CRD’s attempt to achieve religious sanction for the
CIO, while avoiding controversy and courting the guardians of the status quo likewise
stymied any possibility for achieving real change, and helped to stall the process of
unionization in the industrial South.
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Chapter Three: Stemming the Tide
During the course of Operation Dixie, the CIO encountered many obstacles to its
organizing efforts. Some of these obstacles were expected ones, resistance on the part of
employers who attempted to fire union sympathizers, unfriendly policemen and judges who
made life difficult for organizers, and potential recruits who were dubious concerning the
value of union membership. Other obstacles were somewhat less expected.
One day in August of 1946, during the early months of Operation Dixie, in the small
town of Hogansville, Georgia, a local Baptist minister, the Rev. Marcus Drake of Antioch
Baptist Church, approached the gates of the U.S. Rubber plant that the CIO was attempting to
organize. The minister had brought some leaflets with him to the gates that day, which he
began to pass around. These leaflets denounced the CIO in no uncertain terms as constituting
“the mark of the Beast,” invoking the demonic forces prophesied in the Book of Revelation
to warn workers away from involvement with the CIO. This same minister later preached
sermons against the CIO, and published a letter in the local newspaper attacking the union
and its organizing drive. While this incident was, no doubt, shocking to organizers, it was
not uncommon.62
Several years later, in 1949, on the eve of a representation election at a textile plant in
Marietta, Georgia, the Reverend J. A. Landers of Clarksdale Baptist Church took to the
airwaves of WFOM to denounce the CIO, and to urge its defeat in the upcoming NLRB
62

“The Role of the Churches In Relation to the CIO Southern Organizing Drive,” Folder 16, Box 1556, John
Gates Ramsay Papers, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections Department, Georgia State University,
Atlanta. (Hereinafter referred to as “John Ramsay Papers.”)

43

election. Rev. Landers blasted the CIO as an outside “intruder,” as “communist,” as “unAmerican and un-democratic,” and quoting various scriptures to the effect that workers
should be content with their wages, denounced the CIO by flatly stating that “it isn’t Bible.”
Urging his listeners to accept his interpretation as correct, Rev. Landers stated that “If the
Bible says it, I believe it, and that settles it and we all will profit by its guidance.63”
Opposition to the CIO cloaked in Biblical justification was not, however, limited to
Georgia. Throughout the South, from Tennessee to Texas, CIO organizers encountered
preachers who urged their followers to reject the CIO in the name of Christianity. In Lyman,
South Carolina, during a drive at the Pacific Mills in 1949, a Baptist minister told his
congregation that “its either Christ or the CIO,” adding that “you can either be a Christian or
a CIO man, but you can’t be both!” In Tennessee, the CIO state director, Paul Christopher
was faced with an evangelist named J. Harold Smith, the man who reportedly created the oftquoted slogan that CIO stood for “Christ Is Out – Communism Is On.64”
These incidents were bad enough from a public relations perspective, but it appeared
that such attacks were also successful in undermining organization efforts. Dave Burgess, a
CIO organizer in South Carolina, felt that “the CIO has lost two NLRB representation
elections at the Aragon-Baldwin Mill in Rock Hill, S.C., largely because of the active
opposition of the Northside Baptist Church leaders and minister.65” Other organizers

63

Letter from David Burgess to Robert Cahoon March 26, 1950, Folder 155, Box 1568, John Gates Ramsay
Papers.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.

44

reported similar experiences, blaming religious opposition for their inability to conduct an
effective organizing drive.
Religious opposition to the CIO came in a variety of forms and formats. As already
mentioned, sometimes this opposition took the form of individual preachers using their
pulpits to denounce the CIO and urge their congregations against unionism. Sometimes this
opposition took a more slick and polished form. Several newspapers, often mailed to
workers at plants that had been targeted by the CIO for organization, attacked the CIO in
primarily religious terms. The most notorious of these were the Militant Truth, and the
Gospel Trumpet. The Gospel Trumpet was a newspaper published by “Parson Jack”
Johnson, a Baptist minister in Columbus, Georgia, whose efforts were subsidized by textile
manufacturers, including the Bibb Manufacturing Company, whose plant in Porterdale,
Georgia was the targeted by the CIO for organization.66 The Militant Truth, published by
Sherman Patterson, had a wider circulation than the Gospel Trumpet, and was the longer
lasting of the two, continuing to be published up through the 1970s. Both newspapers
attacked the CIO as a communist organization devoted to the destruction of the American
way of life, and anti-thetical to the teachings of Christianity. Both publications also had a
tendency to find their way into worker’s mailboxes in the days leading up to a representation
election.
It is difficult to quantify exactly to what degree these attacks hurt the CIO in its
organizing efforts. When workers voted against the CIO during a representation election
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they did not give their reasons for doing so. Some workers, no doubt, were not influenced at
all by religious criticism of the CIO. Some workers supported the union despite such attacks,
and many probably voted against it for a variety of other reasons. It is likely that some
workers, wavering in their decision about whether or not to vote for the union, were
influenced by religious arguments, or used them to justify a decision that they had already
made for other reasons. Despite the difficulties involved, years after the fact, in untangling
the motives of Southern workers, there is no doubt that organizers at the time felt that these
attacks were having a negative effect on their efforts.
These religious attacks, although not entirely unexpected, must have, due to their
personal nature and sheer virulence, come as a bit of a shock to many of the leaders of the
CIO who were, by and large, religious men themselves. Moreover, the CIO had enjoyed
generally good relations with religious leaders in the North, particularly with the Roman
Catholic Church, although also with representatives of the mainline Protestant
denominations. Indeed, it was common practice for CIO conventions during this period to
open with a benediction from a priest or minister, and leaders of the CIO, particularly the
organization’s president, Philip Murray, often spoke of the CIO as acting out, in worldly
affairs, the principles of Christianity. Given these factors, the assault on the CIO by religious
leaders in the South must have come as somewhat of a surprise, and have been perceived as
not simply hurtful, but as deeply unfair. It is, after all, one thing to go into an organizing
situation knowing that one is likely to be attacked by clergy who see no need for unionism in
their community, and quite another to be denounced as an agent of the Antichrist.
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But there was a more practical consideration as well. If, as organizers were reporting,
these attacks were hindering organization efforts, indeed, causing the union to lose
representation elections, then something had to be done to address the problem. As noted,
the CIO had generally positive relations with religious leaders in the North, but problems had
arisen from time to time. One of these occasions had been the campaign by the United
Steelworkers of America (USWA) to organize the Bethlehem Steel company in Buffalo,
New York. Initially, local ministers, at the instigation of the company, had come out in
opposition to the union. Through the efforts of USWA official, and Presbyterian layman,
John Ramsay, the CIO had successfully convinced these ministers to change their minds and
support the union. The election at Bethlehem was won by the CIO.67 Ramsay continued to
serve as the USWA’s liaison to the religious community in the capacity of Community
Relations Director for the union. Ramsay thus seemed the obvious person to send South, in
the wake of religious attacks on Operation Dixie, to turn the tide of opposition to the CIO on
the part of southern ministers. Ramsay would not be working alone, however. Joining him
would be Lucy Randolph Mason, who had served as the CIO’s roving community relations
representative in the South since the late 1930s. Mason, a native of Virginia, was herself the
daughter of an Episcopal minister, and the cousin of a bishop. Also on the staff of the newly
formed Community Relations Department was Ruth Gettinger, who was likewise, active in
religious affairs in the Methodist church.
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The initial task facing the CRD was, largely, a reactive one. Although a proactive
response, in the form of the establishment of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups would
come later, and will be discussed in Chapter Three, the initial task was to try to undo the
damage that had already been done by ministers who claimed that the CIO was an irreligious
organization that good Christians could not join. How this goal could be accomplished,
however, was an interesting question. Ramsay and his staff could, and did, travel to cities
where the CIO was conducting an organizing drive in order to speak before the local
ministerial alliance in order to try to win support for the CIO, but with the small staff
available to the CRD, this tactic was, perforce, of only limited viability. Rushing about the
entire region attempting to counteract attacks on the CIO could quickly consume the entire
energies of a small office, and assume the character of attempting to stamp out brushfires
while the whole forest burned.
The approach taken by the CRD was, ultimately, a more pre-emptive one. In order to
attempt to head-off possible religious objections to the CIO before they could be formulated,
and at the same time to address current critics, the CRD embarked on a publicity campaign.
The office produced a series of pamphlets, for distribution to ministers, that compiled various
religious arguments in favor of unions, as well as statements made by denominational bodies
in favor of worker’s rights to join labor unions. These pamphlets were then made available
for distribution to ministers across the South, and more particularly those in communities
where the CIO hoped to conduct organizing campaigns.
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Considerable amounts of energy went into producing these pamphlets. The question
of worker’s rights to organize was a burning issue during the years immediately preceding
Operation Dixie, and most of the religious denominations had made some statement on the
issue during the 1930s and 1940s. These official statements generally recognized the right of
worker’s to join unions, and were generally supportive of unions in the abstract.68 The
Federal Council of Churches, an interfaith body comprising representatives from the major
mainline Protestant denominations, and a body that had a general reputation for theological
and social liberalism, had, moreover, made numerous statements in support of organized
labor over the years. The task then, for the CRD, was to collect this information and to
disseminate it throughout the South. Additionally, some time was devoted to soliciting
statements in support of the CIO from prominent religious figures as well as researching the
policies of various religious bodies concerning labor unions. This work required constant
updating and revision as new statements were issued, and new endorsements were received,
and indeed, new versions of these pamphlets were being produced right up through the end of
Operation Dixie in 1953.
These efforts produced a number of pamphlets, the most notable of which, were
“Religion Speaks to Labor” and “Labor and Religion.” The CIO had already received
statements of support from Reformed Judaism, the Roman Catholic Church, and various
Mainline Protestant denominations. “Religion Speaks to Labor” added to these
pronouncements statements from additional groups, including the Southern Baptist
68
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Convention, the Methodist Church, and the Presbyterian Church, USA. This was a sound
decision, as the proportion of the Southern industrial workforce that was either Jewish or
Roman Catholic was minimal69, and it is unlikely that statements from these two religious
traditions would have carried much weight with the average Southern worker.70
Indeed, the religious situation in the South was quite a bit different than that
prevailing in the North. While Northern society included sizable, and important, Jewish and
Roman Catholic populations, the South was notable for its overwhelming Protestantism.
This Protestantism was not, however, a monolithic unity. Underneath the broad banner of
Protestantism teemed literally hundreds of denominations, splinter groups and sects. The two
largest denominations in the South were the Southern Baptist and the Methodist churches,
but in addition to these large denominations were a bewildering array of Free Will, Primitive,
and Missionary Baptists, Holiness Churches, Pentecostal Churches, Pentecostal Holiness
Churches, Churches of God, Churches of Christ, and other assorted sects and independent
congregations.71
Independence was, in fact, a hallmark of southern religion generally. The churches of
the South were, as a rule, much more autonomous and less hierarchically structured than was
common in the North. As noted, the Roman Catholic church, with its rigid hierarchy of

69

The two notable exceptions to this general statement concerning the number of Catholics in the South are the
states of Louisiana and Kentucky, although it should be noted that these two states were not particularly
significant in Operation Dixie.
70
Indeed, considering the rampant anti-Semitism and ant-catholic feeling that historically characterized the
South, endorsements from these groups would probably do more harm than good. This is a topic that will come
up again in the discussion in Chapter Three of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups.
71
Odum, Howard, Southern Regions of the United States, University of North Carolina Press, 1936, pp. 141149.

50

bishops and archbishops, papal bulls, and administration was relatively small in the South.
The Episcopal Church, outside of Virginia was a small, and relatively, elite presence. The
Presbyterian Church, although more populous than the Catholic or Episcopal denominations,
was a distant third behind the Baptists and Methodists. Among the larger denominations in
the South, the prevailing spirit was one of congregational independence and anti-hierarchical
autonomy.72 Baptist churches, for example, although they might belong to the Southern
Baptist Convention, were completely independent bodies, and are in no way bound by the
proclamations, or decisions of the Convention as a whole.73 Indeed, the independence of the
local congregation, extending even to the hiring and firing of ministers, was one of the
traditional hallmarks of the Baptist religion. Other, smaller, denominations, such as the
Churches of God, were even more fiercely independent and, of course, independent churches
and itinerant evangelists were answerable to no one.
What emerges then, is a picture of Southern religion as consisting of a multitude of
more-or-less independent congregations, headed by fiercely independent ministers who were
unlikely to be persuaded by arguments from authority. Unfortunately it was just such an
argument from authority which the CRD sought to make. The point, hammered home again
and again by Ramsay and company, through pamphlets such as “Religion Speaks to Labor,”
radio addresses, and articles in religious publications was this: that the national councils of
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the various religious denominations did not oppose labor unions, and thus local
congregations should, at the very least, stand neutral when the CIO came to town for an
organizing drive.
What this approach overlooked, unfortunately, were the very realities of Southern
religion. To begin with, there is the factor of church’s very real material interest in the nonunionization of the South. Whether the pastor in question was the minister of the church
where the mill management attended74, or ministered to the mill-village church that was
subsidized by the owners of the mill, small town Southern pastors were not exactly
disinterested parties. Moreover, due to the congregational independence of Southern
churches, the fact that the national convention had recognized the right of workers to join
labor unions would likely carry very little weight. The larger problem, however, was the
very sources that the CIO was appealing to. The Federal Council of Churches (later renamed
the National Council of Churches) had a particularly low reputation among southern religious
leaders to begin with. Catholic and Jewish endorsements of organized labor were also
unlikely to be of much help in the South. While endorsements from major denominations
such as the Southern Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian were somewhat more helpful,
these endorsements were often rather vague, generally stating that the denomination in
question recognized the right of workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining.75
74

It is perhaps helpful to note that in many denominations, particularly the Southern Baptist, the minister is
chosen by the congregation, and may be dismissed at their pleasure. This, of course, stands in marked contrast
to the norm in more hierarchical churches, such as the Roman Catholic, or Episcopal denominations, where the
priest is answerable to a bishop, rather than the parish. This fact no doubt caused many ministers to feel
somewhat constrained when it came to taking positions that might not be popular with their congregations.
75
“Religion Speaks to Labor,” Folder titled “Religion,” Box 53, John Ramsay Papers.

52

While such an endorsement could be read as approving the CIO, it could just as easily be
read as endorsing unionism generally, but not the CIO specifically. Ministers could, and did,
insist that local unions were allowable, but national unions were not permissible.
Alternatively, a minister could admit that some unions were acceptable, but that the CIO was
unacceptable because of its associations with communism, violence, strikes, racial policies,
etc. Finally, these statements were made by national or regional bodies, and did not always
reflect the sentiments and beliefs of the local community. While a national convention might
recognize the right of workers to join unions, it is clear that many local representatives of
those bodies did not, and further, that they felt no compulsion to accept the national
convention’s declarations as binding. Given the noted independence of Southern clergy, this
is not particularly surprising. Given that very real material, economic, interests were often at
stake, it approaches naivete to expect that ministers, hostile to organized labor, would
suddenly accept the CIO with open arms simply because the national convention of their
denomination had passed a resolution acknowledging the legal right of workers to join a
union.
Unfortunately, for the CIO, naivete seemed to be the dominant characteristic of the
CRD during Operation Dixie. For all of the experience that Ramsay, Mason, and company
had of the South, for all that they seemed to be well aware of the fact that ministers often had
an economic interest in preventing unionization, they still proceeded as if they could
convince religious leaders to change sides if only they could present them with enough
information. The CRD’s vision for how this plan would work is laid out in a pamphlet
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written by Dave Burgess, a Congregationalist minister and CIO organizer in Rock Hill, S.C.,
who worked closely with the CRD office. In “Unions and Preachers,” Burgess tells a
fictional tale of an organizing drive in a small mill town. The characters in this morality play
are the union organizer, Pat Jones, the millhand, Fred Styles, the young, liberal minister Joe
Black, and the older, established minister Rev. Rogers. Reverend Rogers is the minister of
the uptown church attended by the mill owner, and is, initially, opposed to the union
organizing drive.76
Pat Jones is in the midst of an organizing campaign that is proceeding slowly, and
meeting with opposition from the mill management. Fred, the millhand, seems to be
interested in the union, but is concerned that joining a union might violate his religious
beliefs. These concerns are worsened by a revivalist named Smith, who we later learn has
been hired by the mill owner to preach against the union. In order to allay Fred’s concerns,
Pat Jones gives him a “little pamphlet,” telling him that it is a “statement on how the
denominations stand of labor questions.” Although the pamphlet is not named in the story, it
is probably safe to assume that it was a copy of the CIO’s “Religion Speaks to Labor.”77
After looking over the pamphlet, Fred is still confused and uncertain about what to
think. On the one hand, the pamphlet that Jones gave him seems to imply that unions have
the blessings of the Church. On the other hand, he has been told by Evangelist Smith that
Christianity and labor unions are incompatible. Unable to decide what he thinks about the
issue, Fred goes to see the preacher at the “millhand’s church,” the young Rev. Black. To
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Fred’s evident surprise, Rev. Black agrees with the union organizer and unreservedly defends
the need for labor unions. Reverend Black points out that Jesus loved the poor, and was
despised by the rich, and rebuts Fred’s concerns about kindness and brotherhood among
Christians by stating “sure, be Christian. Kindness, however, must go with justice and
equality. It’s not right for you to be getting 30 cents an hour and your family going hungry
while the company is making fat profits.”78
Evidently convinced by Rev. Black and the union pamphlet, Fred proceeds to join the
union. Meanwhile, organizer Jones and Rev. Black get together to discuss the situation in
town. Black complains that ministers are opposing the union, citing Rev. Rogers as an
obstacle to his organizing efforts. Keen to be of help to the union, Rev. Black arranges a
meeting between Rogers and the Jones, where the two experience a true meeting of the
minds, and Rev. Rogers is converted to a champion of industrial unionism. Rogers proceeds
to go to the mill to meet with his Sunday School superintendent, the mill owner, and
convinces him to cease opposing the union and recognize the new local, which has,
meanwhile, elected Fred as its first president. There is a happy ending in which labor and
management are reconciled, Evangelist Smith is summarily fired by the mill owner, and “a
new era in millville” begins.79
This is, evidently, what the CIO hoped would be the result of the CRD’s outreach
efforts. As a dream scenario, it’s not bad. If, on the other hand, this is what the CRD really
expected to occur, they were, undoubtedly, extremely disappointed. As it happened, this was
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not the usual turn of events during Operation Dixie. There were a few “Reverend Blacks” to
be sure; young, idealistic clergy fresh out of seminary who held liberal views concerning
economics and labor unions. That there were very many post-conversion “Reverend Rogers”
figures, on the other hand, is exceedingly unlikely.
During the course of Operation Dixie, there was no massive change of heart among
the ministers of the South. For whatever reason, whether they were unconvinced by the
theological arguments put forth by the CRD, or because they were bought and paid for by the
industrialists of southern industry, ministers continued to oppose the CIO, and champions of
labor did not emerge in any significant numbers from among the ministers of the South. The
CIO retained some ministerial support, but this came chiefly from its established allies –
Roman Catholic clergy, rabbis, and a few liberal ministers from among the mainline
Protestant denominations. This latter group tended to be young, idealistic, and recently
graduated from seminary. Moreover, the CIO failed to make any real inroads among the
group which most vociferously opposed them, and whose support might make the most
difference, namely the working-class preachers from non-mainline denominations, who
tended to be clustered in ministries which catered to mill-workers.
Ironically, this group of ministers, whose congregations were most likely to contain a
high percentage of workers eligible for membership in the CIO, was viewed with a fair
amount of suspicion and distaste by union leaders. The CIO’s pamphlet “Labor and
Religion,” for example warned of “thousands of misguided cultist ministers,” who “work
side by side with those they would influence, or preach from churches located in working
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class neighborhoods.” The same publication lamented the fact that “unfortunately, most
socially enlightened, formally trained young ministers locate in middle-class communities,
far from the centers of the greatest need.” While denouncing “cultist ministers” as not
representing “true religion,” the pamphlet argued that, rather than seeking to work with the
materials at hand and win over the misguided, that the answer lay in the future. “Religious
seminaries should train their best men to serve industrial workers,” the pamphlet declared,
leaving the issue of what to do in the meantime somewhat vague.80
This dismissive, and strangely, for the CIO, elitist attitude towards working class
religion, seemed to characterize the outreach activities of the CRD during Operation Dixie.
The CIO had the support of religious liberals, the Catholic church, and some segments of
Judaism. None of these groups were particularly well represented in the South. What the
CIO needed was religious support from local leaders with influence in the southern
communities in which they were organizing. This support could come, potentially, from
basically two main sources – mainline Protestant ministers, whether they be Southern
Baptists, Methodists, or Presbyterians, or from smaller, non-mainline sects, such as the
Holiness churches, the Pentecostals, or the Assemblies of God. What appears to have
happened is this: the CRD largely wrote off the smaller, more working class organizations as
a hopeless cause, and chose to focus on larger denominations which had gone on record as
supporting some version of worker’s rights to join labor unions.81
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Whether this was a conscious decision, or simply the way that events worked out, is
difficult to determine. The CRD certainly did not go out of its way to antagonize the smaller
sects, but neither did it devote a great deal of effort to cultivating them. A revealing incident
in this regard occurred in July of 1947, when Dave Burgess, a CIO organizer based in Rock
Hill, S.C. who worked closely with Ramsay, received a letter from G.H. Montgomery of the
Publishing House of the Pentecostal Holiness Church. Montgomery wrote to Burgess after
seeing an article in Textile Labor concerning Burgess and his work for the CIO.
Montgomery requested that Burgess answer a few questions concerning his religious views
on such basic issues as the authority of the Bible, the resurrection, the second coming, the
existence of heaven and hell, the existence of a personal God, and the existence of the devil.
None of the questions related to labor issues, and were, presumably, intended to determine
Burgess’ orthodoxy, or lack thereof.82 Montgomery included a pre-addressed, stamped
envelope, and requested that Burgess reply at his convenience. Rather than accepting this as
a valuable opportunity to enter into dialogue with a representative of the Pentecostal Holiness
Church, a denomination that was popular among mill workers, Burgess chose to ignore the
letter completely. In a letter to John Ramsay, Burgess explained that he based this decision
on the fact that “when in Union Seminary [Union Theological Seminary in New York City] I
made a thorough study of the Pentecostal Holiness Church, and I found that it was viciously
accounted for 36 out of a total of 83 churches predominantly attended by mill workers, and found, moreover,
that the sectarian churches were rapidly expanding in membership. See Pope, Liston, Millhands and
Preachers, pp. 98-103, particularly tables XIX and XXV. What this suggests is that, in choosing to ignore the
smaller non-mainline sects, the CRD was, effectively, ignoring a religious community that included a larger
percentage of the workers that the CIO was hoping to organize.
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anti-labor in doctrine.” Burgess noted that he had consulted with Franz Daniel (the director
for Operation Dixie in South Carolina,) and Don McKee (another CIO organizer working in
South Carolina with Burgess,) and that both men concurred with his decision.83 Considering
that the purpose of the CRD was, in theory, to neutralize anti-labor sentiment in the religious
community, this was a strange position to take to say the least. Unfortunately, this decision
to write off influential opponents to the CIO, while focusing on those who were already
sympathetic, albeit unable to be of much help, was far from uncommon.
In a way, the decision to focus on mainline Protestant clergy made a certain amount
of sense. These denominations were, after all, formally on record as acknowledging union’s
right to exist and this, at least, was a start. The situation among non-mainline Protestant
churches was somewhat less clear. In a special, condensed, version of “Religion Speaks to
Labor” published in the December, 1950 edition of The Witness, John Ramsay and Lucy
Randolph Mason wrote that “we have not been able to discover any church among the
Holiness, Pentecostal, and Church of God groups that forbids its members to join unions.”
For a section devoted exclusively to the Pentecostal Holiness Church, Ramsay and Mason
noted that the church, in its “Discipline of the Pentecostal Holiness Church” published in
1945, expressly permitted its members to join labor unions, and excluded unions from its ban
on “oathbound secret societies, social clubs, and corrupt partisan politics, etc.”84 While
perhaps not a ringing endorsement, these positions hardly justified the outright dismissal that
Burgess accorded the church.
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Nonetheless, it is somewhat understandable, and perhaps even to be expected, that the
CRD largely chose not to focus its efforts on these groups. Ramsay, Mason, and Burgess
were all members of mainline Protestant denominations themselves, and had ample
experience in their churches. They had all, moreover, had first hand experience in bringing
together religious leaders of their denominations and union officials for the purpose of
cooperation. It probably seemed likely to them that they could do so again in the context of
Operation Dixie. On the other hand, none of the members of the CRD, or the organizers they
worked closely with, were, themselves, members of non-mainline evangelical churches.
Working with Baptists or Methodists probably seemed the safer proposition, and this is, by
and large, the one that they pursued.
What opportunities were lost in not working more closely with charismatics and
sectarian evangelicals is, of course, hard to measure. Perhaps nothing would have come of it.
What is certain, however, is that these groups counted among their congregations many of
the workers that the CIO was attempting to organize. These workers, moreover, were
unlikely to be swayed by the endorsements of ministers from “uptown” churches or mainline
denominations, who commonly looked down upon, and shunned, Pentecostals and members
of other sects. Relations between mainline and non-mainline Protestant denominations were
not always cordial, and so it is doubtful whether the ministers the CRD was targeting would
have been of much help with this group, even had they been persuaded to support the CIO.
Of course, these ministers were not, en masse, persuaded. Opposition to the CIO on
the part of religious leaders was not noticeably weaker at the end of Operation Dixie than it
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had been at the campaign’s beginning. This should not be particularly surprising. Ministers,
as much as anyone else, are a product of their time and their culture. The culture of the
South, at the time of Operation Dixie, was vehemently pro-business and anti-union.
Ministers, moreover, tended to be solidly middle class in terms of both economics and of
social standing and prestige. In a uniquely religious region, ministers were highly respected
and valued members of their communities and, as such, had a very real stake in maintaining
the status quo. Ministers were invested in the prevailing social situation of the South and,
lacking solid reasons to support social change, reasons far more compelling than vaguely
worded endorsements of organized labor promulgated at a national level by their
denominations, were extremely unlikely to sign on in support of wholesale economic and
social upheaval.
This chapter began with a vignette from Hogansville, Georgia at the start of
Operation Dixie, and it is perhaps appropriate to end it here with another scene, also from
Georgia, but this time from the small town of Hazlehurst, from the year 1952, the year before
Operation Dixie formally came to an end. During the summer of 1952, a CIO organizer
named John Scott was working to organize the Cook Lumber Company in Hazlehurst. As
the campaign moved forward, John Ramsay was called in to assist Scott by meeting with the
local ministers to explain the CIO’s position and solicit their help. Things seemed to be
proceeding well, according to accounts, “considerable headway had been made,” despite
opposition from the local business community.85
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Then, on July 31st, Scott was attacked by company guards while distributing literature
at the plan gates. Later that day, Ramsay and Bill Strength, a labor singer who sometimes
worked with Ramsay, went down to the plant to continue leafleting for an upcoming union
meeting. They too were attacked by “seven men who had gathered on the other side of the
main gate.” Bleeding from their wounds, the two men fled the scene and went to look for
help. While looking for aid, they found that “the Mayor of the town was ‘absent,’ the
sheriff’s office ‘empty,’ & a police car ‘unmanned.”86
The events of the 31st occurred on a Thursday. Two days later on Saturday a “mob of
50 men gathered outside of the hotel to renew their threats against the organizers. The CIO
men were compelled to flee the town.” Evidently not as much headway had been made as
the union organizers had hoped. This sort of occurrence was common enough, in and of
itself, during Operation Dixie, but what makes this scene of organizers run out of town
interesting for our purposes is the comment made by Francis McPeek in his account of the
incident for Labor Letter. McPeek observed that “the shocking thing has been the failure of
the ministers & churches to condemn the outrageous incident.”87
By 1953, Ramsay and the CRD had invested seven years in attempting to change the
hearts and minds of the religious leaders of the South. Pamphlets, newspaper articles, radio
addresses, and countless personal speaking appearances had been made throughout the South
attempting to win the support of southern religious leaders. In the case of Hazlehurst,
Ramsay had personally met with the local ministers and explained the CIO’s purpose and
86
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goals in their community. After all of this effort, the CIO was still being run out of small
southern towns, while prominent industrialists broke the law with official approval. After all
of this effort, the churches still stood silent when called upon to speak out in favor of the
union. After all of this effort, the churches still remained silent in the face of violent
repression and flagrant criminal behavior.
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Chapter Four: Walking Together
The previous chapter examined the reactive efforts of the Community Relations
Department to address hostility towards the CIO and Operation Dixie, but there was another
side to the CRD’s program in the South. There was also a proactive side to the department’s
community outreach efforts, and that program will be examined in this chapter. While
attempting to answer the critics of organized labor was obviously a top priority, the CRD also
sought to pre-empt criticism by courting religious leaders at the outset of an organizing
campaign, before they had taken any firm position, for or against the union. This work
usually consisted of informal visits, usually made by either John Ramsay or Lucy Randolph
Mason, to local ministers in order to explain the CIO’s position and to allay any concerns
which minister’s might have about CIO activities in their communities. These informal visits
laid the groundwork for more formal organization later, with the ultimate objective being the
formation of local Religion and Labor Fellowship groups. These groups brought local
ministers and union officials together for luncheon discussions in which issues could be
discussed and, ideally, some measure of mutual understanding could be achieved.
The motivating idea behind this concept was Ramsay’s conviction that many of the
differences between organized labor and organized religion were rooted in a mutual lack of
knowledge and understanding. Many union members were alienated from the churches, or, if
they attended, chose to keep their union membership secret, for fear that they would be
stigmatized for their membership in a labor union. Similarly, Ramsay believed that many
ministers simply were uninformed about labor issues, and did not really understand the
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purposes and goals of organized labor. Fellowship groups, then, would serve as a forum for
both sides to air their grievances, address their misperceptions, and move forward, united by
common understanding and Christian brotherhood. At least, that was the way things were
supposed to work out.
While this scenario may, at first blush, seem a bit naive, Ramsay had some reason to
think it might work during Operation Dixie. Religion and Labor Fellowship groups were the
flagship program of the National Religion and Labor Foundation, an organization with which
Ramsay was very familiar, having served for many years on its Executive Board. The
National Religion and Labor Foundation had been founded in 1931 by liberals within the
Protestant religious community in order to solicit support for the labor movement.
According to Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, the NRLF failed to gain much interest from within the
ranks of the AFL, but “quickly attracted labor leaders from the ranks of the CIO. Over the
years, members of the Foundation’s Executive Board included such CIO leaders as Van
Bittner, James B. Carey, Walter Reuther, Joseph Bierne, and David McDonald.”88 The
NRLF enjoyed some degree of success and influence in the North, boasting "active chapters
in the principal cities,”89 and the Religion and Labor Fellowship Group model had worked
successfully in a number of situations including the Bethlehem strike with which Ramsay
was involved in Buffalo, New York.
As a result of the demonstrated success of the Religion and Labor Fellowship model
in the North, Ramsay evidently felt that this plan could be successfully transplanted to the
88
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South during the course of Operation Dixie. While the pamphlets produced by the CRD
would serve as a forum in which to counter criticism, the fellowship groups could serve as a
way to pre-empt criticism by making friends and forming alliances. The CIO was acutely
aware of the role that ministers could play in either aiding or obstructing a strike or
organizing campaign in their community, and thus it was thought to be of paramount
importance by the CRD for ministers to be informed of both labor’s overall goals and
program, as well as labor issues in their own cities. If the CIO could gain the goodwill of
local ministers, perhaps even their assistance in their organizing efforts, the task of
organizing the South would be made noticeably easier. Even if all that was accomplished
was inducing ministers to remain neutral in contests between labor and capital, the potential
benefit would be substantial.
The first step to forming a Religion and Labor Fellowship group was to locate
interested ministers. In the South, this was not as easy a task as might be thought. The usual
approach was for either Lucy Mason or John Ramsay to visit a community in which the CIO
was beginning an organizational drive and call on the local ministers, trying to sound them
out in order to gauge sympathy and locate likely supporters. These visits were typically
followed by a request to address the local ministerial alliance on the topic of organized labor
and its aims. In these talks, Ramsay tried to reassure the ministers that the CIO was a
responsible labor union, led by sober, religious men who sought simple justice for their
members, and social stability for the country. Ramsay also took this opportunity to address
misconceptions concerning unions that clergy might hold, rebutting charges of communism
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and violence. If this initial presentation went well, a RLF luncheon group might
subsequently be formed.
In a 1947 article describing the formation and functioning of a fellowship group in
Ohio, written for the magazine Prophetic Religion, John Ramsay expressed his confidence in
the ultimate success of the RLF model in the South. In describing the Ohio group, Ramsay
wrote that “it could be Columbus, Georgia, although this story is of Columbus, Ohio…The
same kind of story is now in the making in Columbus, Georgia, and many other southern
towns and cities.”90 Unfortunately for Ramsay, this statement was overly optimistic.
Columbus, Georgia was not Columbus, Ohio, and RLF groups never achieved the same
success in the South that they had in the North. Indeed, there is a certain irony in the
comparison, considering that Columbus, Georgia was the hometown and base of operations
for Parson Jack Johnson, the publisher of the viciously anti-labor publication The Gospel
Trumpet, which routinely attacked labor unions generally, and the CIO particularly, as antiChristian organizations to which no god-fearing man could properly belong.
Despite a busy schedule of engagements, which included hundreds of speaking
appearances before ministerial alliances throughout the South, Ramsay was never quite able
to achieve his vision of Religion and Labor Fellowship Groups sprouting up in “towns and
cities” throughout the South. While ministers often gave him a polite reception, and perhaps
a few vague, if sympathetic comments, some met his advances with outright hostility, and
others conveniently arranged to be unavailable when he called on them. As it turned out, it
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was one thing to gain a polite hearing at a personal appointment, or even to be invited to
speak at a ministerial alliance meeting, but quite another, and more difficult task, to convince
ministers to actually take the step of forming a fellowship group. When things got past the
point of mere talk, and proceeded to the plane of action, many ministers proved unwilling to
take on an active role. Whether out of sincere conviction, unwillingness to take on
controversial issues, or outright antagonism to labor, many clergy professed an unwillingness
to get involved in labor issues. A common explanation for minister’s reluctance to form a
fellowship group was that they felt that the role of the church was to stand neutral in contests
between capital and labor, that the role of the church was to attend to spiritual, rather than
material, matters. Other ministers, who had proved friendly enough when the issue was
merely one of talk, proved decidedly less friendly when called upon to actually take action.
By the end of Operation Dixie, the CRD had managed to form a mere nineteen RLF
groups throughout the entire region.91 Of these groups, several were located in major cities
such as Atlanta, well outside of the major textile areas that were targeted by Operation Dixie.
Among the groups that were formed, it is difficult to gauge whether any of these groups
contributed substantially to the CIO’s organizing efforts. Certainly, organizing did not go
well during the campaign, and religious opposition to the CIO, as noted previously, was not
noticeably less at the end of Operation Dixie than it had been at the start. No doubt this lack
of results stems from the simple scarcity of fellowship groups, but in part the explanation
probably lies in the nature of the groups’ activities.
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Although the CRD hoped that fellowship groups would ultimately result in greater
activism on the part of clergy, and Economic Justice, the newsletter of the National Religion
and Labor Foundation requested its members to “support strikes, to write senators and
congressmen in support of favorable legislation, and to communicate the concerns of the
labor movement to their congregations,”92 the actual activities of the RLF groups were
mostly educational. Representatives from organized labor, or sympathetic organizations,
would speak at luncheons on various topics such as minimum wage laws, or the role of the
churches in society. A free lunch and an uplifting talk on general principles do not an
organized, involved corps of activist clergy make.
Another problem with the implementation of the RLF program had to do with the
makeup of its membership. On the one hand, simply finding enough interested ministers to
start an RLF group could be a daunting task indeed, and to a certain extent the CRD
obviously had to work with the materials at hand. On the other hand, the clergy recruited by
a local RLF group tended to reflect the CIO’s natural base in the religious community, not
necessarily those ministers who could be most helpful to the union’s cause. Thus, for
instance, the CRD could usually count on recruiting the local Catholic priest, perhaps the
local rabbi, if there happened to be one in the community in question, and a handful of liberal
Protestants. While the moral support supplied by these clergy was, no doubt, heartening,
their congregations did not usually contain many of the workers who the CIO was trying to
enlist, and their influence in the community tended to be accordingly small. The largest
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denomination in the South, by far, was the Southern Baptist, followed by Methodists.93
Although breakdowns of denominational membership by economic class and occupation are
difficult to locate, it is clear from contemporary reports that these denominations were also in
the majority among industrial workers.94 Further, it should be noted, that smaller, more
evangelical sects were also popular among working class southerners, particularly those
employed in the textile industry.95 If the Religion and Labor Fellowship groups established
by the CRD were to have any significant influence in supporting organized labor, it would
have been important to draw its constituents from these denominational groupings. There
was, moreover, also a class dynamic at work. Southern religion, as a whole, was highly
stratified by class.96 Episcopalians, for example, tended to be of a higher social and
economic class than, say, Baptists. Mainline Protestants, as a whole, tended to be higher
class than members of evangelical sects. Within the mainline denominations themselves,
moreover, there was stratification depending on what sector of the community the individual
church catered to. For instance, there were “uptown” Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian

93

Howard Odum found that “of the more than 4,000,000 white adult members of Protestant churches in the
Southeast, nearly 2,500,000 belong to the Southern Baptist Convention and a little over 1,500,000 to the
General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.” Odum, Southern Regions of the United States,
p. 141.
94
This observation is also supported by Liston Pope’s findings in the community of Gastonia, North Carolina
where, out of a total of 83 “mill churches” in the community, the Baptist denomination accounted for 27
churches, and the Methodists claimed another 11, for a total of 38, or nearly half of the churches which were
predominantly attended by mill workers. Pope, Millhands and Preachers, p. 103.
95
See footnote 80.
96
For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Pope, Millhands and Preachers, pp. 96-116. Pope’s findings
indicated that “wide social differences appeared between Presbyterians and Methodists, Lutherans and Baptists,
with each denomination becoming especially identified with one (or at most two) of the emerging social classes.
When the older religious traditions proved too inflexible to meet needs arising from novel social situations, new
sects arose to fill the gaps: the Church of God, the Wesleyan Methodists, the Pentecostal Holiness Church, and
other neoteric cults.” p. 96.

70

churches, that tended to cater to white collar workers, including bankers, clerks, lawyers, and
mill managers. At the other end of the spectrum, there were mill churches, often subsidized
by companies, that ministered to the employees who lived in mill villages, or in working
class residential areas.
Thus, in order for a minister to be an effective advocate for the CIO, not only would
he have to be of the right denomination, but also from the right socio-economic strata within
that denomination. While a Baptist minister whose congregation consisted of mill workers
would be an ideal ally for the CIO, an uptown Baptist minister, whose congregation excluded
mill workers (presuming of course that he could be convinced to support the union) would
likely be much less influential among the workers.
Of course, by and large, uptown ministers did not support the CIO. Many opted
instead to remain neutral, and many who did choose to get involved did so on the side of
employers.97 This might not have been very significant, had the CIO been able to marshal its
own supporters from the ranks of the mill village clergy, but this seldom happened. As was
noted in the previous chapter, the CRD tended to be mistrustful of the sects, viewing them as
predisposed to anti-labor views, uneducated as to the social and economic issues, and
generally unreliable. While this was perhaps true in many cases, the Pentecostal, Holiness,
and Church of God ministers were, nonetheless, influential leaders within their communities,
and could have, if successfully cultivated, significantly aided in the work of organization.
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There were a number of factors at work here. On the theological plane, southern
Protestantism tended to be much less concerned with society, than with the relationship
between the individual believer and God. The Social Gospel had not made deep inroads in
the South, and religion in the region tended to be much more personal and spiritual than was
the norm in other parts of the country.98 This focus, in turn, led to a somewhat otherworldly
view of the role of religion. If the world was corrupt, wicked, and plagued by a variety of
social evils, the role of the church was to bring salvation to the individual and point the way
towards a better day in the afterlife, rather than leading the way in social reform in the here
and now. This tendency ran throughout southern religion, but was particularly noticeable in
the non-mainline, evangelical sects. Broadly speaking, these denominations did not see their
role as one of social involvement, and the idea of getting involved in labor disputes seemed
both foreign and inappropriate.99
There existed also what might be termed a counter-cultural element to sectarian
Protestantism. Members of these churches saw themselves as a people apart, uniquely
sanctified and justified, separate from and apart from the common mass of sinners. This
mass of sinners, it should be noted, often encompassed members of mainline denominations
who were seen as corrupt, worldly, and insincere Christians, who compromised their faith by
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participating in the larger society.100 This fact could, and did, work against the CIO, in that
many ministers from these sects tended to remain unconcerned with social issues, and if the
subject came up, were quite capable of telling their congregations not to concern themselves
with such matters but instead to focus on God and the life to come.
However, the latent anti-systemic trend in sectarian evangelical religion could cut
both ways. It is but a small step from denouncing the sinfulness of the world in general, to
denouncing the sinfulness of laissez-faire capitalism run amok. The evangelical sects had no
particular respect for wealth, and tended to regard the poor as both virtuous and oppressed.
The prophetic books of the Old Testament with their ringing denunciation of those who
profited through the oppression of the weak resonated particularly well with sectarian
theology. Perhaps most importantly, non-mainline, evangelical ministers were low status
outsiders with regard to the southern religious establishment. Pentecostal or Holiness
preachers were not regarded with the same respect and esteem as were their Baptist or
Methodist brethren, and thus had much less of a stake in preserving southern society as it
was. If the clergy of these denominations were not natural allies for the CIO, then they were,
at the very least, potential allies. This potential, however, was largely unrealized during the
course of Operation Dixie.
This leeriness of smaller Protestant sects fits well with the overall pre-occupation of
Operation Dixie’s planners with presenting the union as a mainstream, non-radical, and,
above all, respectable organization that posed no threat to the overall social structure. This
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approach, as has been previously noted, did not square particularly well with the objectives
of Operation Dixie. Had the South been fully organized, working-class people brought into
electoral politics, and wages brought up to northern standards, southern society would have
been drastically changed. Existing power structures, both economic and political, would
have been overturned. In order for this to occur, however, traditional sources of influence
and authority would have had to be challenged, and this is precisely what the CRD, and the
CIO as a whole, failed to do. Instead, the CRD attempted to present the CIO as a sober,
“responsible,” organization that would insure stability and not upset the status quo. Whether
this approach was deluded or disingenuous does not matter so much as the ultimate fact that
southern religious leaders simply did not buy it. The CRD could talk all it wanted to of
promoting Christian brotherhood, understanding between the classes, and the similarity
between the purposes of organized labor and Christianity, but southern clergy, for the most
part, were simply not convinced. Instead, they saw the CIO, correctly it might be added, as a
divisive force whose agenda, if fulfilled, would upset the economic, racial, and social
structure of southern society and, in the process, challenge their own standing within it.
In order to understand how this process worked, it might be helpful to present a case
study in frustration: the CRD’s attempt to form a Religion and Labor Fellowship in the
textile town of Anderson, South Carolina. The CRD tried, over a period from 1947 to 1950,
to gain a foothold in Anderson, without any appreciable success. The CRD’s involvement
began when John Ramsay made a visit to Anderson “in the spring of 1947… as a matter of
routine.” Initially, things seemed to go well. The head of the Ministerial Association was
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out of town, but Ramsay was able to meet with the Chairman of the Association’s Program
Committee. Apparently this meeting went well, for the ministers voted at their April meeting
to invite Ramsay to come and speak to them at their May monthly meeting.101
Ramsay spoke to the ministers on May 5, 1947, and reported that he received a “very
cordial reception from the ministers,” who “continued to question me after my address for
about one and one-half hours.” Although the ministers had received him politely enough,
they were apparently unready to commit just yet to support for the CIO. As a follow up to
the May 5th meeting, Ramsay received a letter from the Ministerial Association of May 30th,
thanking him for his appearance, but, significantly, adding that “I think another meeting to
hear a representative of the manufacturers would be interesting. Ministers should be
informed of all currents of thought and actions about us.”102
The letter also contained a clipping from the Anderson Daily Mail of May 19, 1947,
which reported the Ministerial Association Meeting at which John Ramsay had spoken. The
newspaper article reported that “the organizers would, indeed, gain a point if they could
induce ministers to regard the CIO as a ‘missionary’ effort, and could line up pastors, either
individually, or as a group, back of the movement.” However, the report was confident that
this would not occur, stating that “knowing Southern ministers as we do, we predict that the
CIO organizers and leaders will have even less success in lining up ministerial support than
they have had in convincing cotton mill employees that the CIO is the implement that will
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bring about an industrial millenium in the South.” Unfortunately for the CRD, this prediction
proved to be correct.103
After this episode, the CRD’s efforts in Anderson were, apparently, put on hold for
some time. In the Fall of 1949, Ramsay renewed his outreach efforts in Anderson by mailing
a letter to various “civic and religious leaders” in Anderson, detailing the Community
Relations Department’s program. Clergymen were also mailed copies of two pamphlets,
“The Church and the CIO Together,” and “The Community Depends on Wages.” This
correspondence was followed by a personal visit by Ramsay to Anderson, during which he
met with the Mayor, the head of the Chamber of Commerce, and the head of the Ministerial
Association. At none of these meetings did Ramsay receive what might be called a warm
welcome. The Executive Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, E.W. Meeks, was perhaps
most blunt, informing Ramsay that “the CIO is not welcome in our community, and my
advice to you is to take your people and leave immediately while you can leave peacefully.”
The mayor informed Ramsay of his intention to maintain “law and order in our
community.”104
Ramsay’s meeting with Reverend W. G. Newman, the President of the Anderson
Ministerial Association, serves as an excellent illustration of the ways in which Southern
ministers avoided involvement with the CRD. Evidently too polite to simply inform Ramsay
that he had no intention of supporting the CIO in Anderson, Rev. Newman nonetheless
managed to convey his position. After politely receiving Ramsay at his home, Rev. Newman
103
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complemented him on his address two years prior, and conceded that, upon researching the
position of the Methodist Church on the issue of labor unions, he had found that the church
did, indeed, recognize worker’s right to organize. However, the Reverend hastened to add,
“that this meant local unions and not the CIO.” Ramsay, naturally, argued this point, asking
if “he felt that local management was sinning in joining the Chamber of Commerce which is
a National Association of Management.” Reverend Newman’s reply is not recorded, but it
seems doubtful that he was persuaded by Ramsay’s argument.105
Perhaps as a way of shifting the discussion, Reverend Newman stated that “Anderson
would not tolerate John L. Lewis in their community.” Ramsay, quite correctly, pointed out
that Mr. Lewis had not headed the CIO in quite some time, and asked what Lewis had to do
with the CIO’s drive in Anderson. Rev. Newman “said that Mr. Lewis was the President of
the CIO,” and, when corrected, “said that he was President of all the unions.” Ramsay tried
to address this misconception, pointing out that “Mr. Lewis was President of a great
international union, the United Mine Workers of America, which is an independent union.”
Reverend Newman, however, was not to be persuaded on this point. Newman finally laid the
matter to rest, declaring that “Anderson, S.C. and the Anderson Chamber of Commerce
believes that Mr. Lewis is president of all the unions and I am going to believe with them.”
Perhaps sensing that further argument would get him nowhere, Ramsay requested that Lucy
Randolph Mason be allowed to give a presentation to the Ministerial Association. Newman
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refused. It was clear that the head of the Anderson Ministerial Association was not going to
support the CIO, no matter how persuasive the arguments presented to him.106
Nonetheless, the CRD persevered in Anderson, although continuing to make
little progress. In early March of 1950, Lucy Mason made another trip to Anderson to meet
with ministers and assess the CRD’s chances of gaining support from religious leaders. Her
report was not encouraging. Over the span of a three day visit, Mason spoke with, either in
person, or by phone, six ministers, and searched, unsuccessfully, for five others. Of the six
clergy that Mason met with, only one of them, the town’s Catholic priest, Father Maurice
Daly, was very supportive. Reverend Samuel Hardman, the rector of Grace Episcopal
Church, “advocated my speaking to ministers when some one else brought that up – Father
Daly,” but was “much prejudiced by his feeling about John Lewis.” Mason described Rev.
Ross Johnson, of St. James Methodist Church, as “generally speaking, for unions, but had
many questions to ask which indicated he was not very well informed and accepted some of
the opposition’s ideas.”107
Other ministers were not as welcoming. Rev. Samuel Wiley, of the First Presbyterian
Church, and the former president of the Anderson Ministerial Association, who Ramsay had
described in 1947 as “an exceptionally fine fellow in a large and important congregation,”108
told Mason that “as he and Mr. Ramsay had seen each other, he did not see that anything
would be accomplished by his seeing me.” Mason received a similar rebuff from Rev. Alton
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Clark, of Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church. Mason reported that “he was polite and
said nice things about J. Ramsay, but it was obvious he did not want to see me.” Perhaps
wisely, Mason did not bother attempting to meet with Rev. Newman, who had already
expressed his hostility towards the CIO to Ramsay the previous year.109
A Religion and Labor Fellowship never did get off the ground in Anderson. After
three years of work in the community, the CRD had very little to show for its efforts – the
firm support of the Catholic priest, Father Daly, a handful of clergy, such as the Reverends
Hardman and Johnson who, although not opposed to the CIO as such, were not very well
informed and seemed ambivalent, and the active opposition of Rev. Newman, the leader of
the town’s Ministerial Association. Unfortunately for the CRD, the experience in Anderson
proved to be more the rule, than the exception, for the South as a whole. Where religious
leaders did not actively oppose the CIO, they tended to remain neutral, perhaps willing to
listen to an address or two, perhaps even engage in polite conversation with Ramsay or
Mason, but unwilling to take an active role. The net result of this was, of course, that most
religious leaders remained silent, leaving the field to those who actively attacked the CIO.
What allies the union did manage to attract tended to be men of little influence in their
communities, or men whose congregations did not reflect the CIO’s target demographic. For
all of the CIO’s hopes that the southern experience would conform to the hopeful slogan of
one of their pamphlets titled “Walking Together: Religion and Labor,” the walk, for the
union at least, proved a lonely one.
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Chapter Five: Billy Graham and The Militant Truth: A Case Study of Misconceptions
The previous two chapters have examined, in some detail, the two major programs of
the Community Relations Department of the Southern Organizing Committee of the CIO
during the course of Operation Dixie. In the course of this analysis, several major critiques
have been advanced, mostly having to do with the CRD’s essential failure to grasp the
realities of the southern social structure, and more particularly the role of the Church as a
power broker with a significant stake in southern society. The present chapter will elaborate
on some of these themes through the use of a case study which illustrates many of the points
previously made, while demonstrating the general methodology of the CRD in dealing with
southern religious leaders.
In the Fall of 1950, much to the dismay of the Community Relations staff, the
September issue of a newspaper called the Militant Truth published a lengthy sermon by the
Reverend Billy Graham.110 The sermon itself was innocuous enough, titled “The Home God
Honors,” it set forth Graham’s argument that the basic problem with American society was
the family, or rather, the typical American family’s failure to adhere to Biblical standards.
The sermon set forth Graham’s prescription for a happy home life and warned against the
morally corrosive rise in divorce rates. The sermon contained nothing about organized labor,
and indeed, nothing that would have been particularly controversial in 1950s society.111
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What shocked and worried the CRD staff was not the sermon itself, but rather the publication
in which it was published.
The Militant Truth had been a thorn in the side of the CIO since the early 1940s.
Along with similar publications, such as the Gospel Trumpet, the Militant Truth attacked the
CIO relentlessly, using a combination of rabid anti-communism, racial and ethnic slurs, and
religious rhetoric. There was a great deal of evidence that the papers were subsidized by
industrialists seeking to prevent unionization in the South, and the newspapers were routinely
distributed to workers during the run-up to a union election. The National Labor Relations
Board had ruled that mailing these newspapers to their employees constituted an unfair labor
practice on the part of employers, but distribution continued nevertheless, and the
publications continued to plague the organizing efforts of the CIO. Whether these
publications actually contributed to the CIO losing elections is an open question112, but it is
certainly the case that CIO officials perceived them to be a threat and blamed them for lost
elections.
What was particularly troubling to the CRD about the publication of the Graham
sermon was the possibility that workers, upon reading the article, would perceive its presence
in the newspaper as an endorsement, by Graham, of the contents and editorial perspective
contained in the rest of the newspaper. Billy Graham, although still a young man at the time
112
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of this incident, was a rising star on the American religious scene, and had gained a great
deal of notoriety and public acclaim as a result of his Los Angeles Crusade the year before.
During the course of the Los Angeles crusade, Graham had attracted the favorable attention
of the media, particularly the chain of newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst, who
had apparently perceived a great story in Graham’s evangelism and had instructed his
newspapers to provide favorable coverage.113 As a result, Graham was becoming a national
figure, well liked and respected, and whose apparent endorsement of the Militant Truth could
be expected to carry a great deal of influence among the religious workers of the South.
The sermon, accompanied by a large photograph of Rev. Graham, and an
advertisement for his recent book, Revival in Our Time, accounted for a total of two and a
half pages of the eight page issue, and shared space with several other articles that attacked
the CIO, the Textile Workers Union of America, the Federal Council of Churches, and
communism in general. Given the prominence of the sermon, and the accompanying
advertisement from the Van Kampen Press for Graham’s new book, the impression that Billy
Graham supported the views espoused by the Militant Truth was, if not unmistakable, at the
very least a reasonable assumption. This was precisely what the CRD feared.
However, the case did not seem hopeless. Billy Graham was neither an outspoken
reactionary, nor an avowed enemy of the CIO. Indeed, although Graham’s ministry was
primarily oriented towards the individual’s personal relationship with God, he was known to
have some liberal views, particularly on the subject of race.114 Although Graham was not a
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personal acquaintance of either Lucy Mason or John Ramsay, he was on friendly terms with
various religious leaders, such as the Methodist Bishop Arthur Moore, who were, in turn,
friends with Mason and Ramsay. Thus, the CRD decided that the way to handle this incident
was to speak with Graham directly, to determine whether he was aware of the publication,
and, if possible, secure a denial of involvement and a condemnation of the newspaper and its
agenda.
To this end, Lucy Randolph Mason spent a good deal of time over the next year
trying to talk to Graham. At first, the signs were promising. On October 23, 1950, Mason
had a telephone conversation with Graham, in which the evangelist told her that he had never
heard of the Militant Truth, “and had no idea that a paper of that kind had printed his
sermon.” Mason reported that Graham had told her that “he is for labor and some of his
friends say he is too pro-labor.” Summing up the encounter, Mason wrote that “I got an
impression of great sincerity from Mr. G. and am sure he would not want anything done in
his name that would hurt organized labor.” During this same conversation, Mason set up an
interview with Graham for later that week, presumably in order to discuss a statement which
Mason wished Graham to put out concerning the publication of his sermon.115
While the ideal scenario, for the CRD, was one in which Graham publicly repudiated
the Militant Truth and came out in favor of labor, a backup plan was also in the works. A
number of rather unsavory groups had advertised in the Militant Truth over the years, and
had been endorsed by the paper, including Joseph Kamp and his Constitutional Educational
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League, an organization with ties to various domestic fascist groups, and whose publications
had been endorsed by Adolph Hitler. Information about these connections, along with
citations from the Militant Truth attacking Franklin Roosevelt, Jews, and the United Nations,
had been compiled and was ready to be given to various sympathetic journalists for the
purpose of discrediting the publication.116 However these plans were put on hold for the
moment, until it became clear how Billy Graham would respond. As Lucy Mason put it,
“naturally, if we are going to get from Mr. G. a repudiation of MT, we don’t want to start a
story that implicates him with it, or starts a big fuss just as Mr. G. comes in here for a huge
revival. So mum’s the word for us until after we find just what sort of statement we will get
from Mr. G. and I think it will be satisfactory judging by what he said on the phone.”117 If, as
is evident, Mason hoped that a statement from Rev. Graham was soon to be forthcoming, she
was to be disappointed.
By the end of November, Lucy Mason was no closer to getting a statement from
Graham than she had been a month before. In a letter to Lloyd Vaughn, the South Carolina
Director for the CIO Organizing Committee, Mason reported of Graham that “he and his
public relations man, Beavan, gave both John Ramsay and me, but principally me, because
John was mostly away, a complete run-around.”118 In a telephone conversation between
Beavan and Mason on November 3rd, Rev. Graham’s spokesman had even gone so far as to
defend the newspaper, telling Mason that “other people might consider the same paper that I
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[Mason] call scurrilous a very good paper.”119 By early December, the situation had
evidently deteriorated further, as Lucy Mason felt compelled to seek outside assistance in
order to arrange a meeting with Graham. On December 8, Mason sent letters to Bishop
Arthur Moore and Dr. Lester Rumble in order to apprise them of the situation, and to ask
their help in facilitating a meeting with Rev. Graham. In the course of the letter, Mason
noted that Graham had broken two appointments to meet with Mason, and one with John
Ramsay.120 At the same time, Ramsay wrote to Billy Graham, regretting Graham’s inability
to keep his engagements, both with Mason, and with himself, and warning Graham that
“your associates continue to surround you with protection,” noting that Graham’s association
with a publication such as Militant Truth could damage his reputation.121 Evidently, Ramsay
believed that Graham’s staff was preventing him from meeting with representatives of the
CIO, and seemed confident that if he could simply meet with Graham in person, the whole
affair could be sorted out agreeably.122
Mason’s letter to Bishop Moore evidently had its desired effect. In February of 1951,
Mason wrote to the Bishop to thank him for contacting Graham, and to inform him that a
meeting had occurred between Graham and Ramsay the previous week. Evidently, a friend
of Ramsay’s had arranged that Ramsay and Graham have a meeting in Chapel Hill, North

119

“L.R. Mason’s Memorandum On Conversation By Phone With Jerry Beavan, Public Relations Director for
Billy Graham, November 3, 1950,” Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.
120
Lucy Randolph Mason to Bishop Arthur Moore, December 8, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay
Papers.
121
Unfortunately for the CIO, and as Billy Graham was probably aware (if John Ramsay was not) quite the
opposite was probably true. In the South, at least, Graham’s association with anti-union forces would not have
done much, if anything, to harm his reputation, while an association with the CIO, probably would have.
122
John Ramsay to Billy Graham, December 8, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.

85

Carolina. According to Mason’s account, “they met – they liked each other – they parted
good friends. Billy told John he was anything but anti-union…” However, for all that the
meeting went well, Mason’s account contains no mention of a public statement by Graham
on the Militant Truth issue, and, indeed, no such statement was ever released. Mason and
Ramsay had prepared such a statement for Graham’s approval, but it was never released.
Indeed, there is no evidence to show that the statement was ever presented to Graham, or that
he was asked to issue it.
In any event, despite the efforts of Ramsay and Mason, Billy Graham never made a
public statement concerning the publication of his sermon in the Militant Truth. Despite the
favorable impression that the minister made on the CRD staffers, nothing substantive was
accomplished as a result of the episode, and the Militant Truth escaped unchallenged by Rev.
Graham. The secondary plan for addressing the Militant Truth, involving criticism by
newspaper columnists sympathetic to the CIO, which had been put on hold by Mason and
Ramsay out of consideration for its possible effects on Billy Graham, was, ultimately
attempted, but results were disappointing. As John Salmond notes, in his biography of Lucy
Randolph Mason, “few of the journalists could use the material, however, and in any case, it
was a poor substitute in the South for a statement from Graham himself.”123
In the end, it seems that Lucy Mason’s initial impression that she was being given the
run-around by Billy Graham and his staff was probably correct. Much like the other
ministers that the CRD encountered during its work in the South, Graham was willing to
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speak with Ramsay and Mason, even sympathize with their objectives in a vague way, but
unwilling to take any action, or engage in any controversy. In 1950, Billy Graham was in the
initial stages of a public career that would last for over five decades, and make him one of the
most well-known, and respected figures in the world. Already a national figure, Graham was
in the process of obtaining an international reputation, one that enabled him to fill
auditoriums around the world, and consult with presidents and statesmen on issues of
national policy. At the same time, in 1950, this meteoric career was just beginning to take
off, having only really begun a year or two prior, and it would probably not be unreasonable
to conjecture that Graham wanted to avoid involvement in any controversy which might
tarnish his reputation, or alienate his supporters. In 1950, and in the South, appearing as a
public champion of labor unions, and particularly the CIO, would have placed Graham in the
center of just such a controversy, and it is thus not surprising that Graham was leery of
placing himself in such a position. Whatever Graham’s own feelings on the topic of labor
unions, and there is no real reason to think he was a staunch supporter of industrial unionism
per se, it is certainly clear that he had no real incentive to insert himself into the contest
between labor and employers, and potentially much to lose if he did.
While Graham’s involvement in this particular episode provides a certain interest due
to his celebrity, the point is one that encompasses much more than Billy Graham as an
individual. The key point is that the same conditions that applied to Billy Graham also
applied, more broadly, to southern clergy as a whole. Billy Graham had nothing to gain, and
potentially something to lose by taking the side of the CIO, and so did southern ministers as a
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whole. Being a minister in the South was a fairly comfortable life. Ministers were, in terms
of status, if not always financially, members of the civic elite, important in their
communities, and treated with deference and respect. Members of the religious
establishment, that is to say, middle class, mainline Protestant clergy had very little reason to
be discontent with the status quo of southern society. They were already power brokers and
important men in their towns and had little reason to attack the existing order, or to aid in an
attack upon the very system which had benefited them so much. There were exceptions to
this general rule, of course, but they were few and far between, and not sufficient to really
upset the balance.
This is not to say, of course, that these were corrupt or unprincipled men. There is
every reason to believe that the majority of southern clergy simply did not think there was
any need, or justification, for their involvement in industrial relations. As has been noted, the
religious style of the South was intensely personal, focusing for the most part on the
relationship between the individual and God, and largely unconcerned with larger social
issues. The Social Gospel message never penetrated very deeply in the South, and was
generally viewed with suspicion by fundamentalists, who tended to associate the social
gospel with religious modernism, that is the school of theology which questions the inerrancy
of the Bible.124 In this context it is not surprising then to find that most southern clergy
simply did not think that unions were any of their business. If anything, southern clergy
probably saw unions as a threat to the industrialization that was commonly perceived, among
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the southern middle class, as a desperately needed cure for the ills of southern poverty and
backwardness. The southern clergy had been among the loudest boosters of the New South
decades before Operation Dixie, and it hardly made sense to expect them to denounce the
fruits of their efforts in the midst of the post-war economic boom.
In targeting Billy Graham and other members of the southern religious establishment,
the CRD was, in effect, seeking the collaboration of societal insiders in a project that
challenged the power structure of southern society. There are many reasons why this plan
did not, indeed, could not, work. Other writers, particularly Liston Pope, have noted the
financial ties between industrialists and southern religious leaders, particularly in the textile
regions of the southern piedmont. The leaders of Operation Dixie liked to blame fear and
intimidation, coming from industrialists and their political allies, for their lack of support,
both from religious leaders, and from the population more generally. While both of these
explanations have an element of truth, they both fail to grasp the larger point, namely that
there was simply no compelling reason for southern clergy to aid the CIO during Operation
Dixie. Some southern clergy did aid the CIO out of a sense of their religious duty to the poor
and downtrodden, but southern religion, as it was practiced and understood by most clergy
did not perceive any obligation to assist labor unions, and the decision to stay out of
Operation Dixie probably caused few ethical qualms among those clergy who stayed aloof,
or even among those who chose to actively oppose the CIO as divisive and contrary to
Christian brotherhood.
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On the other hand, the CRD consistently neglected outsiders, those clergy who stood,
at the best, on the fringes of the southern religious establishment, and those who, thus, had
the most to gain from the sort of social upheaval that would have accompanied a successful
Operation Dixie. While other scholars have made similar points concerning other marginal
figures in southern society, such as African-American workers and political radicals, what
these writers fail to recognize is that the these groups simply did not have the numerical
strength to marshal an effective coalition. One group that did, however—non-mainline
evangelicals and charismatics—was never really taken seriously by the CRD, or consistently
courted. That these religious communities could have been made into allies is, of course, far
from certain. There were various obstacles here too, but strategically it at least made more
sense than trying to win over established elites.
There are some reasons to think that, had the CIO been willing to reach out to nonmainline religious sects, they could have cultivated a base of support that could have proved
quite helpful in organizing the South. As noted in a previous chapter, there was some interest
on the part of some of the smaller sects in promoting industrial unionism. The Rev. Charlie
Pratt, of the Church of God of the Union Assembly in Dalton, Georgia was an enthusiastic
promoter of unionism in general, and the TWUA in particular, because it meshed well with
his biblically-informed analysis of the evils of southern industry. Unfortunately for both
Pratt and the CIO, Pratt’s close relationship with Don West, a southern religious radical and
suspected communist, opened the minister up to anti-communist attacks and red-baiting from
employers and union opponents in Dalton. The CIO ultimately decided to distance itself
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from Rev. Pratt due to the communist issue, but the situation is indicative of the possibilities
for alliance that existed between the CIO and sectarian churches.125
Religion, and religious imagery had also been an important element in many other
social protest and social reform movements throughout the South. Of course the strong role
played by the black churches in the Civil Rights movement springs immediately to mind, but
religion also played an important role, as documented by Mark Fannin, in the Brotherhood of
Timber Workers, and in the Southern Tenant Farmers Union.126 Church membership could
also both inform workers understanding of labor issues as well as serve as an organizational
base from which to organize, as Linda Frankel notes in her study of the 1958 HarrietHenderson strike in Henderson, North Carolina. Frankel writes that “religion provided one
important axis of solidarity for the strikers,” and that “the emergence of revivalism and the
growth of the smaller Pentecostal sects made possible a class-based religious
organization.127”
For all of these reasons then, it seems clear that the problem with the CRD’s approach
to southern religion had less to do with southern religion, as such, than with the manner in
which the CRD dealt with it. In a sense this is a close parallel to the problem with Operation
Dixie as a whole. It was not the case that southern workers could not be convinced to join
labor unions, or think in a class-conscious manner, indeed they had demonstrated the
capacity to do so over and over again in the years prior to Operation Dixie. Rather, the
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problem was that the CIO went about trying to recruit southern workers in a way that could
not possibly have succeeded. Similarly, the CRD, probably could have succeeded in its
mission of forming an alliance with southern religious leaders, had they recognized which set
of leaders to target. Instead, the CRD overlooked the very groups that it had the best chance
of forming workable alliances with, in favor of trying to appeal to religious leaders who had
no incentive, and no inclination, to look with favor on the cause of industrial unionism.
What the Billy Graham episode really represents then, is the failure of imagination on
the part of the Community Relations Department that was characteristic of their broader
program and, indeed, characteristic of Operation Dixie as a whole. To return to the analytic
framework outlined in the first chapter, what the CRD did was this: rather than mobilize the
discontented, educate them as to the situation and its possible solutions, and challenge the
existing hierarchy and deference patterns of southern society, the CRD attempted to bypass
this process altogether by appealing to the existing religious elite in the hope that they would
voluntarily endorse the destruction of the very system that provided them with their elite
status. That Billy Graham, and the rest of the southern religious establishment was not keen
to sign on to this program, should not surprise us in the least.

92

Chapter Six: Conclusion
As has been demonstrated in the previous several chapters, the efforts of the
Community Relations Department of the Southern Organizing Committee, as with Operation
Dixie as a whole, were not successful. After years of effort, by the time of Operation Dixie’s
close in 1953, the religious community of the South was not noticeably more pro-labor than
it had been at the beginning of the campaign in 1946, indeed, if anything the hostility towards
organized labor was probably increased. Religious leaders, in significant numbers, never
came out in favor of the CIO, and anti-labor religious attacks on the organization persisted,
largely unaffected, until the end. The argument presented here, advanced at some length, and
in some detail, has been that the reasons for this failure were two-fold.
In the first instance, the CRD went about its task with little regard for the antihierarchical structure characteristic of southern religion. By attempting to argue from
authority, that is by appealing to the denominational statements favorable to organized labor
promulgated at the highest levels of national church bodies, the CRD failed to recognize the
tenuous nature of authority in the Protestant denominations that dominated the South. Unlike
the Catholic Church, where the pronouncements of Bishops and Popes had binding authority
on parish priests, Southern Baptist congregations, for example, were largely independent, and
felt no need to abide by the statements of the Southern Baptist Convention.
Secondly, the CRD failed to recognize that there was no real advantage in aiding
labor unions for southern clergy. Southern ministers were integral, respected members of
their communities, a part of the civic elite which had shaped southern society in the years
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after the Civil War, through the industrialization of the New South, and who, by and large,
had sanctioned the very system of economic relations that the CIO was intent on overturning.
That these leaders were not quick to join forces with the CIO is much less surprising than is
the fact that the CIO entertained the idea that they might.
In seeking to court these members of the societal elite, the CRD was pursuing an
agenda that was, frankly, quite a surprising one for a social movement. Rather than seeking
to achieve social change from the ground up, the CIO was, in effect, hoping to short-circuit
the long and arduous process of mobilization and struggle by convincing those at the top to
agree to the proposed change willingly. In this, the campaign of the CRD was actually in
accord with another tactic of the CIO during this period, namely the effort to convince
employers that unionization would actually be a positive good for their factories, in that it
would ensure labor force tranquility and increase productivity. Neither tactic, it should be
noted, was particularly effective in achieving unionization. When it came right down to it,
neither group of elites saw the need for labor unions in the South, and neither group was
swayed by the arguments of the CIO. The reasons for this were really quite simple; both
groups were already at the top of the social pyramid of the South, and neither needed the CIO
to remain in place. Indeed, as the power elite of the South correctly perceived, the CIO, far
from being an ally, was a potential threat to their continued power and position. While the
whole thrust of Operation Dixie was geared towards portraying the CIO as a non-alien, nondisruptive force in the South, the reality was quite different. As the leaders of the CIO
recognized, even if they were unwilling to admit it publicly, the unionization of the South
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would have irrevocably transformed the region, economically, socially, and politically. The
civic leaders of the South, not surprisingly, were fairly content with the economic system that
they had built, and saw no reason, or advantage, in change simply because the CIO desired it.
Given, then, that the plan of action that the CIO adopted in the South was little short
of disastrous, the question arises as to why they chose to proceed in such a manner in the first
place. As noted towards the start of this paper, the historian of Operation Dixie, Barbara
Griffith, has explained the CIO’s failure during Operation Dixie as arising out of the
inappropriate use of northern methods in the South. One element of this explanation, that
having to do with the use of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups, has already been
explored somewhat in chapter three, but there is more to it than this. In a larger sense, it
seems as if the CIO, through the CRD, was attempting to replicate, in the South, the same
sort of political coalition that existed in the North, only with a crucial difference. What the
CRD was attempting to create in the South was a reflection of the current alliances prevailing
in the North, rather than the embryonic New Deal coalition that had coalesced during the
1930s, the CIO’s formative period in the North.
The CIO had come to power and prominence in the North, in large part, due to its
alliance with the Democratic Party, and particularly with the New Deal political coalition put
together by Franklin Roosevelt.128 Seizing on the opportunity presented by the social and
political upheaval of the Great Depression, Roosevelt had fundamentally transformed the
Democratic Party by forging a new political coalition out of various disparate groups
128
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including the various immigrant communities of the Northeast, urban blacks, and the urban
working class.129 This represented an enormous shift in power in the North, away from the
northern business interests that had dominated the Republican Party, and began a process of
political realignment that would continue for decades to come. Through participating in this
alliance, the Congress of Industrial Organizations was able to secure the patronage and
protection of the Roosevelt administration, and thus was able to grow and flourish with the
aid of the Wagner Act and the NLRB.130 By the time of Operation Dixie, the CIO had been a
major player in national politics, and had benefited from its association with the New Deal
for a decade. The leaders of the various constituent unions were important figures on the
national political scene and had become, in the North anyway, something akin to members of
the elite in their own right. It would have been only natural then, for them to think that a
similar arrangement could be achieved in the South as well.
The major flaw in this conception of possibilities, however, is that the leaders of the
CIO, perhaps out of the present-mindedness to which people, and politicians in particular, are
often prone, neglected to remember the actual details of their rise to power. The CIO had not
come to its strong position of the 1940s through an alliance with the prevailing powers of the
1930s. Indeed, quite the contrary. What the CIO had done, was to ally itself with outsiders
who, although they possessed potential, were not solidly in position. The New Deal coalition
needed all the support it could get in the mid 1930s, and thus the support of organized labor
was a valuable acquisition. If Roosevelt was going to solidify his position, and cement the
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dominance of the Democratic Party in national electoral politics, he needed organized labor
on his side, and thus he was willing to court their support with the not inconsiderable power
of the federal government.
In contrast, the CIO, during Operation Dixie, attempted to garner the support of the
established societal elite of the South. These civic leaders did not need the support of
organized labor. The elites of the South were firmly entrenched, with no major challengers
in sight. Indeed, far from needing the support of the CIO, the economic and political leaders
of the South saw the union as a positive threat to their society, potentially disrupting the
economic system on which their dominance was built.
Given this situation then, the failure of Operation Dixie represents no mystery. The
existing social system of the South simply contained no place for organized labor. The CIO
made a pitch to the southern elite for their support, but this elite was not interested in
anything the CIO had to offer. The CIO made its pitch to the workers of the South, and the
workers, by and large, were not convinced that the CIO had anything to offer which they
could not get on their own with considerably less trouble. Those few workers who were
convinced, and wanted to join a union, were, for the most part, fired, beaten, threatened, or
otherwise coerced by their employers to the point where no significant union presence ever
materialized in the South. Ultimately, the CIO simply failed to make the case for its
existence in the South, and the campaign was a failure as a result.
What was true for Operation Dixie as a whole, was true for the Community Relations
Department as well. The CRD tried to persuade southern ministers that supporting unions
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was the right, proper, the Christian thing to do, and in this they failed. They failed, largely,
for the same reason that Operation Dixie as a whole failed. They attempted to create change
without creating controversy. Ramsay and the other staffers of the CRD appealed to a group
of people, the clergy of the South, for help, when there was no real reason for this group to
help them. They appealed to a sense of duty which, by and large, was not recognized in
southern religion. Southern religion was not dominated by the Social Gospel; southern
clergy, for the most part, simply did not see their role as one that involved meddling in
industrial relations or power politics, and, in the absence of any compelling rationale for their
involvement, most clergy were disinclined to intrude into matters which they did not feel
related to their mission of bringing people into a closer relationship with God.
There was also, as had been brought out during the course of this analysis, a class
element involved. The CRD was, for the most part, extremely distrustful of the non-mainline
Protestant denominations. These denominations tended to be intensely personal, focused on
an almost otherworldly style of religion that eschewed the day to day realities of the world,
and emphasized instead the spiritual world to come. These denominations also tended to be
antagonistic towards organizations of any kind, and particularly organized labor. And yet, as
demonstrated by churches such as the Church of God of the Union Assembly, these groups
could, if conditions were right, be powerful allies of organized labor. Moreover, as lowstatus outsiders, the members of these denominations had nothing to lose, and potentially
much to gain, by an alliance with the CIO and the social change that the organization of the
South would have set in motion. It is by no means clear that such an alliance between these
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groups and the CIO would have been possible, much less successful, but the failure of the
CRD to pursue such an option surely represents one of the missed opportunities of Operation
Dixie.
In sum then, the CRD, through its various enterprises, focused its attentions on groups
that had no logical reason to support the CIO, while at the same time neglecting those groups
that, because of their low position in the hierarchy of southern society, not to mention their
large constituency among the very workers that the CIO was attempting to organize, might
have become allies in the organization of the South, and wasted a good deal of time and
effort in an enterprise that was doomed from its beginning. That this was a tragedy of wasted
time and talent, goes almost without saying, but that it was of a piece with the overall lack of
vision and understanding that characterized Operation Dixie as a whole, must be
comprehended in order to make sense of the overall failure of the CIO’s campaign to
organize the South.
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